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The US electric market has been a regulated monopoly for 
several decades but now is changing rapidly. Regulation is 
introducing competition to the electric market to reduce 
electric costs and help make US industry more competitive. In 
the last years, legislation has also introduced competition in 
the airlines, natural gas and telecommunications industries. 
Parallels with the deregulation of the electric power industry 
can be drawn from these experiences. 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) 
and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), brought competition 
to the electric generation sector and opened access to the 
transmission system for "wholesale wheeling" transactions. 
"Wholesale wheeling" is the transmission of electrical energy 
and power from a seller to a buyer (both of them power 
generators) through the transmission lines owned by a third 
party. 
EPAct also encourages states to look at "retail wheeling" 
(retail customer-to-power generator transactions). "Retail 
wheeling" or "direct access" would probably give electric 
customers the option of buying electric power from any utility 
or other electric power generator and having it delivered 




Retail wheeling is attractive for electric customers since 
it would give access to lower-cost electricity produced in other 
parts of the US. States where the cost of electricity is high 
are also interested in reducing electric rates to foster 
economic development and the creation of new jobs. 
State Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) and legislatures 
have begun to study the issues and the potential public benefit 
that could result from introducing retail wheeling. There is 
debate over the advantages and disadvantages of retail wheeling, 
but no state has yet enacted legislation, either requiring or 
granting authority to a PUC to order retail wheeling. Even 
though retail wheeling has not been legislated, a few "retail 
wheeling" and "pseudo-retail wheeling" activities and 
initiatives have occurred. 
B. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
Although retail wheeling regulation is not defined yet and 
its details would probably change for each state, this work 
intends to provide large industrial and commercial electric 
customers with the issues that could be important in a retail 
wheeling market. The use of this knowledge could be translated 
into increased competitiveness and reduced operating costs. The 
objectives of this work are the following: 
• Review the present developments in the direction of retail 
wheeling (PURPA, EPAct, FERC ruling, state PUCs initiatives, 
etc.). 
~ 
• Present a probable retail wheeling scenario (or set of 
scenarios), based on retail wheeling cases, activities and 
analysts' comments. 
• Develop recommendations that could help electric customers 
under this scenario. For example, retail users should now 
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start to understand the complex nature of transmitting and 
distributing electricity (provided in this work) . They 
should also have a broad understanding of Regional 
Transmission Groups (RTGs), various NOPRs (Notice of Proposed 
Regulation) and FERC rulings (provided in this work) . 
Thus, the deliverable is a Users Guide to Retail Wheeling, as 
far as present development allows. 
C. OUTLINE 
Chapter two presents a description of the national 
electric power system. Chapter three is a historical review of 
electric regulation and deregulation at the wholesale level. 
The effects of PUHCA, PURPA, EPAct, and several FERC rulings are 
presented. 
Chapter four presents the potential benefits and costs of 
retail wheeling, as well as the issues associated with the 
implementation of retail wheeling. This chapter also reviews 
the retail wheeling activities from two state PUCs: (a) 
California Proposal ("Blue Book") and (b) Experimental Program 
in Michigan. Developments in the direction of retail wheeling 
will also be reviewed. 
Chapter five presents several "retail wheeling" and 
"pseudo retail wheeling" activities and initiatives. Chapter 
~~J 
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six reviews the situations under which the cases presented in 
Chapter five occurred. The development of a retail wheeling 
scenario proved to be impractical. There are too many 
possibilities and none of the experts agree as to what might 
happen. Based on situations reviewed in this chapter, 
recommendations were developed and a survey was used in an 
attempt to validate the results. This survey was sent to: (a) 
some large electric customers (both industrial and commercial) 
and (b) the customers, consultants and utility representatives 
involved in the cases presented in Chapter five. Some comments 
based on experiences in the deregulated natural gas industry are 
also presented. 
Chapter seven summarizes the recommendations and presents 
the conclusions of this work. The appendices present a sample 
of the survey used in this work (Appendix A), the survey 
exemption from the Institutional Review Board (Appendix B) and a 
list of acronyms used through this work (Appendix C) . 







DESCRIPTION OF THE NATIONAL 
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 
A. ELECTIUC POWER SYSTEM 
An electric power system can be divided into five 




• Distribution {primary and secondary) 
• Use 
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Figure 1. Single-line diagram of an electric 
power system showing various levels distinguished 




Almost all the electric power used in this country is 
generated and transmitted in the form of three phase alternating 
current (ac) at a frequency of 60 Hz. Most of the electric 
power generation units use an alternating current (ac) electric 
generator powered by a water driven turbine (hydroelectric 
plants) or a steam driven turbine. Approximately 85% of the 
electric generation in the US is obtained with steam-powered 
turbine generators while hydroelectric plants produce 10% of the 
total production [2]. Coal, natural gas, oil and uranium are 
usually used to produce steam. Other energy sources used to 
produce electricity are wind, geothermal, solar cells, and tidal 
power. Generator ratings range from 650 to 1300 MW [3]. Common 
generating voltages are 14-18 kV [4]. 
2. Transmission [5] 
Transmission lines are used to: (a) carry electric power 
from the electric generators to the distribution systems and 
(b) connect the interconnected systems. 
High transmission voltage is used to minimize losses when 
transmitting over long distances. Voltage is changed using 
power transformers. Electric power is converted from 15 to 20 
kV (from the generator) to a higher voltage (115 kV to 765 kV). 
The voltage is chosen depending on the length of the 
transmission line (these lines span across up hundreds of km) . 
Voltages used are: 
• Extra High Voltage (EHV: 345 to 765 kV). Used for long lines. 
• High voltage (HV: 115 to 230 kV). 
~ 
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Line capacities range from 100 to over 4000 MVA. 
High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) lines are used to 
transmit electric power for very long distances (>600 km) or to 
connect systems operating at different frequency. In these 
types of lines, ac power is converted to direct current (de) 
power, transmitted through HVDC lines and then converted back to 
ac. 
3. Subtransmission 
Bulk power substations reduce the voltage to 34.5-138 kV. 
These lines are shorter and with less capacity than transmission 
lines (<100 MVA). Electric power is branched to distribution 
substations and supplied to large consumers. 
4. Distribution 
In the primary distribution system, distribution 
substations reduce voltage further to 4.16-34.5 kV. The voltage 
is finally reduced to the level required by the users at the 
distribution points (typically 208/120, 480/277 or 240/120 V) . 
The circuit that normally serves the customer is the secondary 
distribution system. In some cases, large customers purchase 
electricity at higher voltages and run their own substations. 
5. Use 
There are three types of load: commercial, industrial and 
residential. This work concentrates on large industrial and 
commercial customers since they are the ones who would likely 
pursue retail wheeling first. 
,_,._ ·-'·- ~ - ··-----
l 
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B. INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 
Most adjacent power systems are interconnected forming 
regional, multi-state power systems. These systems produce most 
of the electricity sold in the US [6] . Interconnected ac 
systems operate at the same frequency. 
Interconnected systems have several advantages [7]: 
• Increased generation reliability. Reliability is defined as 
" ... ability to deliver uninterrupted electricity to customers 
upon demand, to whatever degree required" [8]. For example, 
a loss of a generating unit in one area can be made up by 
increasing generation outputs in all connected areas until 
standby units are brought on line. 
More economic operation. The operating cost of the 
interconnected system is lower than the sum of the individual 
systems' . Power transfers can be scheduled to take advantage 
of incremental energy cost differences, seasonal or peaking 
hour differences, etc. Other transactions that are 
economically advantageous in interconnected systems are: 
Sale of surplus power - Surplus power can be sold to an 
interconnected company on a long-term firm supply basis, 
or on a when, and if available basis (non-firm basis). 
Capacity interchange - Reserve capacity from other systems 
can be used at certain hours to cover the predicted peak 
load plus a reserve. 
Diversity interchange - Power can be interchanged between 
systems that have peak loads at different times (hours or 
seasons) . 
Energy banking - Hydroelectric plants could sell energy to 
thermal systems during high water runoff. In exchange, 
hydroelectric plants would buy energy from thermal systems 
during low water runoff. 
Emergency power interchange - Neighboring systems would 
commit to supply emergency power. 
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Utilities in the US have grouped themselves into 
synchronous ac regions, North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC) Regional Councils, power pools, and control areas 
[9,10,11]. 
1. Synchronous ac Regions 
There are four synchronous ac regions in North America 
(see Figure 2): the Eastern Interconnection, the Texas 
Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Quebec 
Interconnection. Within each region, individual utilities 
operate in synchronism with each other (same system frequency). 
Electric power at any point of each region can be supplied by 
generation at any other point. Since these regions have 
different frequencies, HVDC lines are used to connect them. 
The transfer of electricity between two areas generally 
can not be directed over a pre-determined path. Electricity 
will flow over all available transmission lines (including over 
the lines of other utili ties not involved in the transfer) .. 
These flows are called parallel path or loop flows. 
~~ ~o~~J 
10 
will flow over all available transmission lines (including over 
the lines of other utilities not involved in the transfer) . 
These flows are called parallel path or loop flows. 
~~~ 
Figure 2. North American synchronous ac Regions [12]. 
2. NERC R!qiona~ Counci~• 
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and 
its nine regional councils were created in 1968 to ensure the 
reliable and efficient operation of the synchronous regions [13] 
(see Figure 3). Utilities in each region operate independently, 
but have obligations with the other members of the region 
related to the scheduling of operations and the addition of new 
generating capacity. The nine regional councils are 
interconnected into the North American Power Systems 
Interconnection. 
I! CAll 
Eat Cern~ Area Reliability Coordination ~ 
I!RCOT 
Eleelne Reliability Council of Texas 
IIAAC 
Mid-AIIantic: Area Council 
MAIN 
Mid-America lnten:onnec:ted ~ 
IIAPP 
Mid-Continent Area Power Pool 
NPCC 
Nol1heast .._ Coordinating Council 
SERC 
Southeast8m Eleelne Reliability Council 
SPP 
Southwest p- Pool 
wscc 
Western Systems Coordinattng Council 
AFFILIATE 
ASCC 
AlaSkll Systems Coordinating Council 
Figure 3. Areas served by the nine Regional Reliability 
Councils, coordinated by NERC [14]. 
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3. Power Pool.s [ 15] 
Power pools consist of two or more interconnected electric 
systems that coordinate operations to achieve economy and 
reliability in supplying their combined loads. Power pools have 
several operating advantages. They: 
• Minimize operating costs by using the combination of power 
generation units to obtain the lowest operating cost. 
• Minimize the number of generation units in the system that 
operate unloaded to cover the maximum load. 
• Minimize the reserves throughout the system. 
• Coordinate maintenance scheduling to minimize costs and 
maximize reliability by sharing reserves during maintenance 
periods. 
• Maximize the benefits of emergency procedures. 
Existing power pools vary in the extent of their 
integration. They can be classified as "tight" (high 
integration) and "loose" pools (lower integration). A tight 
pool extensively coordinates its planning and operation and is 
controlled by a single control area. There are 
three tight power pools in the US: NEPOOL (with 90 members, 
operates in six New England states), New York Power Pool (NYPP: 
8 members, operates in New York), and PJM (8 members, operates 
in the Mid-Atlantic region) . Some utility holding companies 
also operate as tight power pools. 
Tight power pools generally require that members provide 
transmission access to other members without a direct charge for 
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trades performed through the control area. In exchange, they 
receive a share of the pool's savings from these trades. 
Loose power pools have a lower level of coordination and 
may have less joint planning. There have several control areas. 
An example is MAPP (Mid-Continent Area Power Pool). 
4. Contro1 Areas 
The US interconnected system is divided into 150 control 
areas comprising one or more utilities [16,17]. Each control 
area monitors the: 
• system frequency 
• Net interchange of power over the tie lines 
The system frequency must be kept at the synchronous region's 
frequency. The net interchange of power is the net power flow 
over the interconnecting lines. This value, which is agreed in 
advance, depends on the transactions scheduled by the control 
area. 
The Area Control Error (ACE) is calculated based on the 
error in system frequency and net interchange of power. This 
value represents the shift in the generation output of the area 
that will restore frequency and net interchange to the desired 
values. 
Utilities that wheel power also provide ancillary (or 
control area services). These are called "bundled" services 
since they are integral to the service provided by the utility. 
Ancillary services are necessary to control reliability of the 
transactions and include: frequency regulation, load regulation, 
provision for reserves, scheduling and coordination of services, 
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backup power provisions and voltage support (including reactive 
power supply) . These services increase the operating costs of 
the utility. ~unbundling" services consist of providing 
ancillary services independent of the transmission service 
transaction. 
Any wheeling transaction requires that the sending control 
area increase the net generation and the receiving control area 
decrease the net generation to receive the scheduled amount of 
power. This results in changes in the flows on the 
interconnected network through the entire region. If a third 
utility provides transmission across its system, it will 
experience changes in system losses, transmission system voltage 
conditions, reserve requirements and probably changes in its own 
economic system dispatch which could result in a net increase in 
operating costs. 
5. !YPes of Transmission Service [18] 
The types of transmission service are defined by the 
characteristics of the services requested: 
• Amount of service (capacity and energy), 
• Term of service (initial and termination dates, times, 
seasons, etc.), 
• Firmness of service (conditions of curtailment), 
• Specificity of sources and delivery points, 
• Relationship to control area boundaries, 
• Directionality (one or two way), 
• Specified paths, distances and facilities involved 
• Ancillary services needed. 
The firmness {or conditions of curtailment) of 
transmission service can be classified into [19,20]: 
• Firm - uninterrupted supply of electric energy. A specific 
power source or powerline feeds the electric load. 
• Backup - electric energy that would be available during 
unscheduled outages. 
• Maintenance - electric energy supplied during scheduled 
outages. 
• Interruptible - electric energy supplied, subject to 
interruption by the electric utility under specified 
conditions {e.g. load curtailment riders). 
• Non-firm - electric energy supplied on a when, as, if 
available basis, cancelable instantaneously. 
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Some typical examples include: short-term firm service, 
point-to-point firm service, firm network service, interruptible 
point-to-point service, long-term firm service, etc. Typically, 
the firmer the service, the higher the charges. 
A. REGULATORS 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF ELECTRIC WHOLESALE 
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 
The electric power industry is regulated at the federal 
and state levels. Regulators at the federal level are: 
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) - FERC has 
jurisdiction over interstate transmissions and wholesale 
electric transactions. 
• Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) - SEC regulates the 
structure, finances and operations of many utilities. 
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• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) - EPA sets ambient air 
quality and technology standards for emissions controls at 
electric power plants. It also approves state implementation 
plans for meeting a variety of federal environmental 
standards. 
Other regulators at the federal level are the Department of 
Energy (DOE) and the Rural Electrification Administration (REA). 
States have the primary role in economic regulation of the 
electric power sector and are responsible for retail rate 
setting and associated issues. The principal regulators at the 
state level are the Public Utility Commissions (PUCs), state 
and/or regional energy planning agencies, siting agencies, state 
EPAs and municipalities. 
Conflicts between state and federal jurisdiction arise 
when state retail rate setting determinations conflict with the 
17 
wholesale rate decisions given by FERC. Although federal 
preeminence is well established, the regional character of 
electric power systems has led to increased jurisdictional 
conflict. To maintain system reliability, the industry also 
regulates itself through the North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC) and its regional reliability councils. 
B. UTILITY TYPES 
The following are definitions of different type of utilities: 
• Electric utility - seller of electric energy who has a legal 
obligation to sell over a contract. 
COUs (see definitions below). 
IOU - investor-owned utility. 
Includes IOUs, GOUs and 
GOU - government-owned utility. Includes municipal 
utilities, Federal power marketing agencies (PMAs), the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and state power 
agencies. 
COU - customer-owned utility. Includes rural electric 
cooperatives and generation and transmission cooperatives. 
• TOU - transmission-owning utility. 
• NUG - non-utility generators. Includes QFs, IPPs and EWGs 
~--
(see definitions below). 
QF - PURPA Qualifying Facility. Includes Cogeneration 
Facilities and Small Power Producers that satisfy certain 
requirements. 
• Cogeneration Facility - this type of facility produces: 
(a) electric or mechanical energy and (b) steam or other 
~~~-~~ 
forms of useful thermal energy used for industrial, 
commercial, heating or cooling purposes. 
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• Small power production facility - produces: (a) electric 
energy using biomass,.waste, renewable or geothermal 
resources, and (b) has a power production capacity less 
than 80 MW (with some exceptions). 
IPP - independent power producer. Producers that do not 
own or control transmission system and have no affiliation 
with a traditional electric utility having a franchised 
service area. 
EWG - an exempt wholesale generator is a type of IPP. 
Owns or operates a facility within the US and generates 
electricity for resale. There are exceptions if the EWG 
is outside the US. 
C. REGULATION HISTORY 
1. Federa1 Power Act (FPA, 1935) [21] 
Among other things, the Federal Power Act identifies FERC 
as the agency with primary jurisdiction to prevent undesirable 
anti-competitive behavior with respect to electric power 
generation. It also imposed a division of labor between FERC 
and state PUCs: 
• FERC has the authority to price IOU unbundled interstate 
transmission services but limited ability to order 
construction of transmission assets [22]. 
• PUCs have no authority to price unbundled interstate 
transmission services and have questionable authority to 
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order an IOU to provide unbundled interstate transmission 
services. But the PUCs do have authority to require or deny 
right of construction of transmission lines and the power to 
locate them. 
2. Public Utility Holding comeanx Act (PUHCA, 1935) 
PUHCA was designed to break down a small number of large 
interstate holding companies that had gained control of about 
75% of the private utilities in the US. PUHCA was designed to 
protect consumers, to stop high electric rates and to improve 
reliability in the electric utility industry. 
Since economy of scale was the only way to expand 
efficiently the electric supply nationwide, PUHCA intended to 
limit the use of the holding company structure and to restrain 
the geographic size of utility monopolies. Since then, 
utilities have been regulated as natural monopolies. They were 
granted exclusive franchises to serve a specific area, but 
regulated to verify that they serve all customers and charge a 
reasonable rate. 
3. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA, 1978) 
Changes toward a competitive market place were originated 
by problems in the 1970s and 1980s: skyrocketing fossil-fuel 
prices, lower-than-expected electricity demand, surplus capacity 
and costly overruns on new powerplants causing financial 
pressures on electric utilities [23]. Also, inequities in 
electric markets (like wide variation of electric rates over the 
US and high electric prices relative to the cost of new 
iiliilii 
generation) created the perception that a market with a 
regulated generating sector was no longer viable [24,25]. 
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Cogeneration facilities (see definition in p.l8) for 
industrial users became popular since they could reach 
efficiencies of 80% compared to the 30-40% of most power plants. 
Although cogenerators could produce power economically, they did 
not legally have access to transmission. 
Prior to PURPA, a cogenerator or small power producer 
wanting to establish interconnected operations with another 
utility had three major obstacles [26]: (a) the utility was not 
generally required to purchase the electric output, (b) some 
utilities charged discriminatory high rates for back-up service 
and (c) they could be subject to state and federal regulations 
as an electric utility. PURPA objectives were: (a) to make on-
site generation a viable alternative for large industrial users 
of steam and (b) to open the electric generation sector to 
competition. PURPA provides several benefits to Qualifying 
Facilities (QFs) [27]. PURPA: 
• Requires electric utilities to offer to purchase available 
electric energy from QFs at rates equal to, or less than, the 
utility's avoided cost. 
• Requires electric utilities to provide electric service at 
non-discriminatory rates. 
• Exempts QFs from various state and Federal laws. QFs rates 
are exempted from FERC regulation and also state regulations 
in regard to organization and finance. 
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To obtain the QF status a cogenerator must: (a} generate 
electricity or mechanical power and useful thermal energy from a 
single fuel source, (b) be less than 50% owned by an electric 
utility or an electric utility holding company, and (c) meet the 
minimum annual operating efficiency standard established by FERC 
when using oil or natural gas as the principal fuel source. 
According to this standard, the useful electric power output 
plus one half of the useful thermal output must be no less than 
42.5% of the total oil or natural gas energy input. If the 
useful thermal energy is less than 15% of the total energy 
output of the plant, the minimum efficiency must be 45%. 
A Small Power Producer must satisfy the following 
requirements for a QF status: (a) use as the primary energy 
source biomass, waste, renewable, geothermal resources or any 
combination of those and (b) more than 75% of the total energy 
input must be from these sources. FERC must certify the QF 
status and establish rules under which QFs may sell power to and 
buy power from utilities. PUCs have to implement FERC rules. 
4. Energy Policy Act of 1992 - Title VII (EPAct, October 
1992) 
QFs from PURPA began generating large amounts of power. 
By 1990 and 1991, QFs accounted for nearly 50% of the US added 
capacity. But many believed that it was not rational to rely on 
QFs to meet the national electricity requirements [28]. 
PUHCA was a major impediment to the development of 
independent power projects. The developer of an IPP project 
turned into a holding company (subject to PUHCA restrictions), 
making it difficult for electric generators to operate if they 
were not tied to a distribution franchise. 
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Title VII of EPAct brought a more competitive structure to 
the electric power market industry. EPAct defines policy 
objectives, creates a framework to develop them, and gives 
responsibility for the regulation to the PUCs and FERC [29] . 
One of EPAct's objectives is to stimulate competition in the 
generation sector, increase efficiency in the electric industry 
and lower consumer's energy bills. 
EPAct: 
• Creates a new class of generating facility called Exempt 
Wholesale Generators (EWGs). 
• Opens the transmission grid to utilities and NUGs by giving 
FERC authority to order transmission access. 
a) Exempt Who1esa1e Generators (Subtit1e A) 
An EWG owns or operates a facility that generates 
electricity exclusively for resale· (no retail sale). EWGs are 
certified by FERC and they are exempted from PUHCA's corporate 
ownership and geographic provisions. EWGs can be subsidiaries 
of utility-holding and non-utility companies. 
EWGs must obtain rate approval from FERC. They are not 
exempted from state regulation regarding their organization and 
finances. 
b) Transmission Access and Pricing (Subtit1e B) 
Any electric utility, Federal power marketing agency, or 
other person generating electric energy for resale, can request 
a transmission access order. The application may require the 
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transmission.owner to increase its transmission capacity if 
there is not enough capacity, but he/she would be excused from 
it if, after a ~good faith" effort, he/she fails to obtain the 
necessary approvals on property rights under Federal, State and 
local laws. 
A transmission order would be issued unless FERC finds 
that the order would: (a) decrease the reliability of the 
electric system, (b) replace contractual obligations and (c) 
result in a retail or sham wholesale transaction (which involve 
brokers and other entities not owning transmission and 
distribution systems). FERC must assure that the order is 
issued in the public interest. Transactions between a utility 
and affiliates are prohibited unless the state PUC determines 
that it will benefit consumers, is in public interest and does 
not violate the State law. 
(1) Retail Wheeling 
FERC can not issue a wheeling order to an ultimate 
customer (retail wheeling) or an entity that will sell it to an 
ultimate customer. The Tennessee Valley Authority, municipals 
and cooperatives (entities that have been given a public service 
obligation) are exceptions to this rule. This prohibition does 
not affect state law. 
EPAct does not prohibit a utility from voluntarily selling 
wholesale power to its own customers or those of another 
company[30], but this is limited by state legislation. For 
example, if state regulators accept, a utility can give to its 
customers access to other utility's electricity, or a customer 
~~~~~--------~ 




Transmission rates should promote economically efficient 
transmission and generation of electricity [31]. Transmitting 
utilities may recover "all ·the costs incurred in connection with 
the transmission services and necessary associated services, 
including, but no limited to, an appropriate share, if any, of 
legitimate, verifiable and economic costs" [32]. Costs incurred 
in providing the wholesale transmission services should be 
recovered from the applicant for the order and not from the 
existing customers. 
c) Regiona1 Transmission Groups (RTG) 
A provision not included in EPAct was a negotiated 
agreement between all affected parties to form Regional 
Transmission Groups (RTGs). RTGs would be voluntary 
organizations of transmission owners, transmission users, and 
other entities interested in coordinating transmission planning, 
operation and use on a regional (or inter-regional) basis. 
According to the agreement, FERC would certify RTGs if 
they meet several requirements and provide service within the 
provisions of EPAct. FERC would have regulatory authority over 
RTGs. 
Since FERC does not have the resources to manage the 
entire network by issuing transmission access orders, RTGs would 
help FERC by providing a forum for wheeling requests agreements, 
and by using the electric utility industry expertise to solve 
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technical issues and planning [33]. It is expected that if RTGs 
act in the public interest, competitive markets will evolve 
quicker [28]. 
5 . FERC Rul.ings 
FERC rulings are determined by Policy Statements, cases 
and rulemakings. FERC also issues Notices of Inquiry and 
Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) to obtain comments from 
the interested parties on a specific topic. A Policy Statement 
is finally issued considering those comments. Up to now, the 
most important FERC rulings include: 
• Information Disclosure 
• Comparability Standard 
• Transmission Pricing Policy Statement 
• Stranded Cost NOPR 
• Ruling on RTGs Applications 
• Notice 6f Inquiry on Alternative Power Pooling Structures 
• Power Marketing 
• Mega-NOPR 
a) Information Discl.osure 
In 1993, FERC issued the "Good Faith" Policy Statement and 
the Information Rulemaking. These rulings are designed to force 
parties to divulge sufficient information to facilitate 
negotiations and speed a FERC decision if needed. 
(1) "Good Faith" Policy Statement 
The applicant can file a FERC open access application 
after 60 days of requesting this service to a transmitting 
~~~J 
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utility. After the applicant files a "good faith" request for 
transmission services, the utility has to respond with a "good" 
faith" reply or a transmission agreement. 
A "good faith" request has twelve components and has to 
address the terms, type and conditions of the requested service 
(dates, degree of firmness, amount, etc.). A "good faith" reply 
has five components. The transmitting utility has to respond 
within 60 days of receiving the request (or other mutually 
agreed period), offer an executable agreement or provide 
specific information on the modifications needed on its 
facilities to provide the requested service. 
(2) Information Rulemaking (Form 715) 
Starting on April 1, 1994, transmitting utilities that 
operate integrated transmission facilities rated at more than 
100 kV must submit to FERC a Form 715. This form requires 
information on the transmission system characteristics (maps, 
diagrams), system reliability, power flow, planning assessment 
practices and system performance. The new rule also requires 
reporting of system lambda information each hour (which 
represents the marginal cost of producing electricity). 
This information is available at a Bulletin board (202-
208-1397). For more information on how to access this Bulletin 
Board, you can contact the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
- Electronic Power Data Section at 202-208-2474. 
b) Comparabi1ity Standard 
The comparability standard is key in FERC's 
decisionmaking. Line owners must offer transmission services to 
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third parties on a comparable basis, and at comparable terms to 
those provided to themselves. 
The "golden rule of pricingu: a transmission owner should 
charge itself on the same or comparable basis that it chargers 
for the same service. This does not mean that all customers 
will pay the same price. Prices should be disaggregated which 
would permit different customers to pay different prices. 
In a recent case, FERC limited the comparability standard, 
ruling that native load has priority over non-firm transactions 
[ 3 4] • The native load consists of the customers on whose 
behalf the utility (by statute, franchise or contract) undertook 
the obligation to plan, construct, and operate its system to 
provide reliable service. These include retail native load 
customers and wholesale customers [35]. 
c) Transmission Service Pricing Policy Statement (October 26, 
1994) 
The pricing statement essentially does three things [36]: 
• Caps permissible profits based on the total company revenue 
requirement. The total revenue requirement consists of the 
utility's permissible expenses plus a return on its capital 
investment. 
• Promotes RTGs by giving them greater flexibility than 
individual companies. 
• Extends the comparability doctrine. 
The policy statement allows two types of transmission filings: 
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• Conforming - traditional revenue requirement with 
comparability in access and pricing (but with flexible use of 
innovative rate design) . 
• Nonconforming - non traditional revenue requirement, but 
comparability in access and pricing. 
(1) Conforming Proposals 
A conforming proposal must meet five principles: use cost-
based rates, provide comparability, promote economic efficiency, 
offer fairness, and afford practicability. Conforming proposals 
must also specify the following: 
• Method for measuring costs for purposes of rat~ design. It 
can be any of these five methods: 
Embedded cost - consists of all costs (plus a reasonable 
profit for shareholders) allocated among all the kWh the 
utility sells. 
Transmission upgrade cost 
"Or" policy - consists of the higher of the average 
embedded cost or the transmission upgrade cost, but not 
both. 
Short-run marginal - consists in the operating costs 
incurred (no investments) if a small amount of kWh is 
produced. 
Long-run marginal - consists in the operating costs and 
additional investments required to produce more kWh. 
• Method for treating power flows . Two methods are accepted: 
............. --···~~~~-J 
Contract path - this method assumes that all the 
electricity flows over a particular path on the 
transmission lines that link two utilities (this is not 
what really happens) [37]. 
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Flow-based approach - considers the electricity "loop 
flows" (or "parallel paths") . When power is transmitted 
through the interconnected system, only part of the 
electricity flows over the "contract path" while the rest 
flows over the transmission lines of several utilities and 
power pools. 
• Method for grouping transmission facilities. The following 
methods are accepted: corporate postage-stamp or 
disaggregated approaches (such as zones), or line-by-line 
methods. For example, a "postage stamp rate" sets a 
transmission rate regardless of the distance the electricity 
travels (based on the average historical costs of the entire 
transmission system of each utility on the contract 
path) [38] . 
(2) Non-conforming Proposals 
Before filing a non-conforming proposal, the utility must 
have a conforming comparable tariff on file. Market-based 
proposals will be considered non-conforming. Non-conforming 
proposals must produce greater overall consumer benefits than 
the conforming proposals: greater access, projected price 
decreases to customers, service flexibility, .and promote 
competitive bulk power markets [36]. 
d) Stranded Cost NOPR (June 1994) [39] 
Stranded costs are those costs incurred by a utility when 
a customer stops buying power. from the utility and, instead, 
purchases transmission services from that utility to get power 
purchased from somewhere else. The NOPR covers wholesale 
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stranded costs. The issue of retail stranded costs was left to 
the state PUCs. 
FERC proposes that stranded costs could be recovered by 
contracts or transmission rates. To recover wholesale stranded 
costs, the a utility must demonstrate that: 
• It had a reasonable expectation that it needed to plan for 
the needs of the departing customer. 
• Customer contribution is no more than if it had remained with 
the utility. 
• It will take reasonable mitigation measures (sell stranded 
investments). 
Old wholesale contracts (set prior to June 1994) that do 
not address stranded costs would have a three-year transition 
period in which the parties would try to reach an agreement. If 
an agreement is not reached, the utility could seek to recover 
the stranded cost with transmission rates. Utilities with new 
wholesale power contracts may recover their stranded costs only 
if the contract specifically allows it. 
e) Regional Transmission Groups (RTG) 
Components of an RTG agreement were defined by FERC in 
1993 (like broad and open membership, fair-non-discriminatory 
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governing and voting procedures, etc.) [40]. The following are 
perceived benefits of RTGs [41]: 
• Decision making is more regionally focused. 
• Technical issues will be handled by transmission experts 
familiar with the local situation. 
• Coordinated planning and data collection will be simpler and 
more efficient. 
• Members would mediate in disputes within the RTG. FERC could 
review these processes to assure validity. 
• A more favorable treatment from FERC will occur in issues 
like: 
Proposals that deal with ~loop flows". 
Conforming pricing proposals that are innovative. 
FERC accepted RTG filings for the Northwest Regional 
Transmission Association (NRTA), the Southwest Regional 
Transmission Association (SWRTA) and the Western Regional 
Transmission Association (WRTA) but imposed two conditions for 
the approval of these agreements: 
• RTGs must develop a regional transmission plan. 
• All transmitting utility members have to offer comparable 
services to the other members (or non-members). 
f) Notice of Inquiry on Power Pooling Institutions [15] 
This Notice of Inquiry solicits comments on US traditional 
power pooling and alternative pooling structures. FERC stated 
its belief that the alternative power pooling institutions have 
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great potential and may help resolve or minimize stranded costs 
issues. 
g) Power Marketing 
FERC has permitted power marketers (persons who "buy-sell" 
power) affiliated with electric utilities to charge market based 
rates provided they meet seven standards. 
h) Mega-NOPR [42,43,44,45,46] 
On March 29, 1995, FERC issued a comprehensive NOPR (known 
as "mega-NOPR" or "giga-NOPR") designed to promote competition 
in the wholesale electric industry. This NOPR deals with the 
following issues: 
• Stranded cost recovery 
• Unbundling of services 
• Transmission pricing 
(1) Stranded Investment Recovery 
The NOPR supplements the Stranded Costs NOPR of June 1994. 
Some important points are: 
• Utilities have the right to full recovery of their 
"legitimate and verifiable" stranded costs. 
• Customers terminating wholesale service would be have to pay 
"exit fees". 
• FERC and state jurisdictions are defined. Stranded costs 
from retail wheeling would be left to the state PUCs, but 
FERC would have the authority to step in: 
if the PUCs do no have authority, 
when municipalization occurs, 
when customers go from retail to wholesale. 
A FERC Commissioner said that FERC should also have the 
authority to step in when PUCs do not address the stranded 
cost issue. 
(2) Unbundling of Services 
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The NOPR proposes functional unbundling (of power sales 
from transmission) for new transmission contracts. This would 
require a single tariff for all parties, with separately stated 
rates for all tariff components. 
(3) Transmission Pricing 
Utilities would be required to file comparable open-access 
transmission tariffs that would be available to all wholesale 
buyers and sellers of electricity. Transmission utilities would 
have to offer point-tb-point and network transmission services 
(including ancillary services). There are two generic "pro-
forma" tariffs that set the minimum requirements for these types 
of services. Utilities would have to file their tariffs within 
60 days after the final rule date (which is expected in 1996). 
Otherwise, FERC will file the tariffs for them. Utilities would 
also be required to enlarge their transmission capacity if they 
cannot provide the requested transmission service. 
According to FERC, network transmission service "allows 
the customer to vary its schedule and points of delivery and 
receipt on the grid without paying an additional charge for each 
change" [47]. There are different types of network service: 
points to point (several "points" of power delivery to one 
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"point" of receipt), point to points, points to points. Point-
to-point service is a subset of network transmission service. 
For example, there is a customer (located within a host 
utility control area) that has a network service "points-to-
point". There are three adjacent utilities (A, B, C) 
interconnected with the host utility. For a single transmission 
fee, the customer can buy power from A, B and/or C. Having 
three independent sources of power may be the equivalent of a 
"relative firm" power supply at a non-firm price. 
( 4) Other issues 
The NOPR also includes a Request for Comments on Real-time 
Information Networks (RINs). According to this, utilities would 
have to develop RINs to provide outside parties with the same 
real-time information on transmission and operations that the 
owner utilities have access to. Some of the categories of data 
to include in RINs are: availability of firm and non-firm 
transmission and ancillary services and associated prices, 
projected hourly transfers capabilities, transmission-specific 
information on all transmission requests, etc. RINs are 
necessary to assure fairness in the marketplace since the "mega-
NOPR" only requires utilities to unbundle their functions but 
not to break down their operations into unaffiliated companies. 
(5) Reactions [45] 
Power marketers; utilities, analysts say that the changes 
proposed in this NOPR are not enough because: 
• Open-access tariffs are applicable only to new contracts. 
• Stranded cost provisions may discourage customers from 
leaving utilities. 
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• "Functional unbundling" is not required for retail services. 
CHAPTER IV 
RETAIL WHEELING IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
AND STATE ACTIVITIES 
A. GENERAL 
Although EPAct opened ·the electric transmission system to 
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wholesale wheeling, it did not do the same for retail wheeling. 
With ~retail wheeling", customers would be able to obtain 
transmission service (and probably other unbundled ancillary 
services) from their host utility to purchase power from another 
power supplier. 
There is great interest in retail wheeling for the 
following reasons [48]: 
• There is a wide variation of electric rates across the US. 
This is caused in part by the different levels of capital 
expenditures of the utilities (see Table 1). 
• Electricity prices are high (after deducting transmission and 
distribution costs) compared to the cost of new generation 
(marginal cost). There is a strong correlation between the 
higher prices and the largest differentials of price and 
marginal cost. 
• Economic development and the creation of new jobs depend on 
competitive electricity rates. 
• Industrial customers argue that Demand-Side Management (DSM) 
programs have caused electricity prices to rise while the 
benefits have gone to non-industrial customers [49]. 
Company Residential Rates Percent 
Pair (ceniS per kwh} Difference 
Iowa Electric Light & Power 13.4 
Interstate Power 7 .I 89 
Long Island Lighting 16.4 
Pennsylvania Power and Light 9.0 82 
Cleveland Electric 13.5 
Cincinnati Gas & Electric 7.5 80 
Mississippi Power and Light 11.0 
Mississippi Power 6.4 72 
Philadelphia Electric 14.8 
Pennsylvania Power and Light 9.0 64 
El Paso Electric 11.1 
Southwestern Public Service 7.0 S9 
Interstate Power 8.S 
Minnesota Power S.4 S1 
Ballimore Gas and Electric 10.3 
Potomac Edison 6.7 54 
Arkansas Power and Light 11.5 
Southwestern Electric 1.S 53 
Union Electric 10.3 
St. Joseph Light and Power 6.8 51 
Northern Indiana Public Service IO.S 
PSI Energy 7.6 38 
Commonweallh Edison 12.4 
Central Illinois Public Service 9.2 36 
Commonweallh Electric 13.8 
MassachusetiS Electric 10.3 34 
Bangor Hydro-Electric 12.2 
Maine Public Service 9.9 23 
Table 1. Selected Residential Rate Differences for 
Contiguous or Closely Proximate Electric Utilities [54]. 
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• Belief that competition is desirable in the electric power 
market. 
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Proponents of retail wheeling (industrial consumers, non-
utility power producers and market-liberal economists) think 
that inefficiencies in the electric power industry can only 
diminish with retail competition. Opponents of retail wheeling 
include most electric utilities (even though many of them 
believe it is inevitable), small consumer groups, the financial 
community and environmentalists. 
Retail wheeling would affect the electric power industry 
in five major ways: 
• Enhance competition at the retail level 
• Change rate-making practices by state regulators 
• Stimulate vertical disintegration of the industry 
• Change the "regulatory compact" 
• Make the electric power industry operate more efficiently 
1. Potentia1 Benefits and Costs [51] 
There is no empirical data showing that retail wheeling is 
beneficial to society [52]. Potential benefits would appear in 
the long-term and are difficult to measure whereas the potential 
costs would appear sooner. 
a) Potentia1 Benefits 
• More efficient pricing - Electric rates would be based on the 
utilities long-run marginal cost. Utilities with high 
marginal cost would be left out of the market, which would 
reduce the price of electricity. 
- ~~<C~~~ 
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• More efficient utility operations and investments - Utilities 
would be forced to reduce their costs and improve their 
operational efficiency to stay in business. 
• Stronger US economy - US companies would reduce their energy 
costs and increase their competitiveness. 
b) Potentia1 Costs 
• Lower electric power system reliability and stability -
Technical difficulties could impair the reliability of the 
electric power system. Utilities could neglect coordinated 
long-term regional planning if they are focused on short-term 
costs and contracts. 
• Stranded investments costs - Stranded investment costs are 
those investments incurred by a utility that are no longer 
profitable because of competition in the electric power 
industry (e.g. retail customers stop buying power from the 
utility and buy it from other power suppliers). 
• Electric transmission grid expansion or upgrading cost -
Retail wheeling transactions could overload the electric 
transmission grid. Utilities owning transmission facilities 
would need to invest on their expansion or upgrade to 
accommodate these transactions. 
• Higher prices to captive customers - Retail wheeling could 
result in lower prices to wheeling customers and higher 
prices to captive customers (those who do not have access to 
retail wheeling) . 
40 
• "Uneconomic bypass" - Customers could choose a supplier with 
lower electric rates but higher marginal costs than the local 
utility, increasing the economy's total cost [53]. This 
could be possible since existing retail-pricing procedures 
are based on the utility's embedded cost (not on marginal 
cost) . 
• Disappearance of Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) 
activities - IRP is a planning process for selecting reliable 
generation plants at the lowest system cost. This is 
achieved by opening the process to public review and 
considering both the supply and demand side scenarios. In a 
competitive market, confidential strategic planning would be 
necessary to stay in business, which is opposite to the open 
process of IRP. 
• Disappearance of DSM programs - Utilities would be focused on 
short-term costs and would not invest in DSM programs. 
B. ISSUES [54] 
The implementation of retail wheeling brings highly 
divisive issues. Up to now, no state has enacted broad 
legislation, requiring or granting authority to a state public 
commission to order retail wheeling. The following is a summary 
of the legal, technical and economical/political issues involved 
in the implementation of retail wheeling. 
1 . Legal. Issues 
The authority of state PUCs and legislatures to order 
retail wheeling is questioned because EPAct is not clear about 
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it. This is a subject that must be decided in courts. 
Regardless of this, several state legislatures and commissions 
have already addressed their authority to mandate retail 
wheeling. Even if state commissions could permit retail 
wheeling, FERC would have jurisdiction in setting the price, 
terms and conditions of the transmission service (retail 
wheeling could be considered an interstate transaction because 
of the interconnection to the transmission grid which permits 
the occurrence of interstate parallel or loop flows). 
2. Economic. and Regulatory Issues 
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• Change of the "regulatory compact" - the traditional 
"regulatory compact" gives utilities monopoly over franchised 
areas, in exchange for: (a) an obligation-to-serve and (b) an 
opportunity to recover their investment (cost-of-service 
regulation). Under retail wheeling, utilities would not have 
exclusivity over their franchised areas, so the obligation-
to-serve and the cost-of-service regulation would have to be 
redefined. 
Obligation-to-serve - currently, utilities must serve all 
customers who apply for service from within their service 
area. The utility's obligation-to-serve in a competitive 
market will have to be redefined to answer the following 
questions: 
Will the utility have an obligation to serve captive 
customers? 
Will the utility have an obligation to serve wheeling 
customers who want to return to the system? 
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Will the utility have to provide system back-up or standby 
power to wheeling customers? And at what rates? 
Will the utility have to provide system support? 
Cost-of-service regulation- the utility's total revenue 
requirement is allocated across the customer classes 
according a rate-of-return developed for each class. If the 
utility receives fewer revenues from wheeling customers, it 
could increase the rates for the other customers. 
• Stranded investments - some of the investments made by 
utilities to fulfill their obligation-to-serve could become 
"stranded" in a competitive market. The issue is who 
(wheeling customers, shareholders, captive customers) will 
pay for these investments. 
• Unbundling and pricing of the generation and transmission 
services. 
• Protection of captive customers from higher electric rates. 
• Effect of retail wheeling on IRP and DSM activities. 
3. Technical Issues 
Technical difficulties could affect the reliability of the 
electric system. These difficulties restrict wheeling 
transactions at the wholesale and retail level, but are more 
severe in the latter case. Compared to wholesale wheeling, 
retail wheeling utilities would have to provide not only 
transmission but also distribution services. Retail 
transactions will also be more numerous, frequent and diverse in 
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time and location. The following are the most obvious technical 
issues that could affect retail wheeling: 
• Parallel path or loop flow problems - Wheeling transactions 
could overload transmission lines and increase control area 
operating costs of utilities not in the "contract path" of 
the transactions. 
• Electric grid congestion and line capacity - Congestion could 
prevent the use of the most economical generating plants. 
Congestion could be caused by the maximUm current capacity of 
the lines and voltage constraints at buses [55]. 
• Line losses - Wheeling transactions could increase 
transmission line power losses. 
• Metering problems - A network of meters and a telemetering 
system would have to installed from the retail customers to 
the utilities generating and supplying power to keep track of 
the transmitted power. 
• Generation and transmission planning - The issue is whether 
utilities have to plan for generation and transmission 
capacity to serve retail wheelin_g customers or not 
("obligation-to-serve"). 
• Construction or upgrade of transmission lines - Improvements 
to the present transmission systems may be necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of retail wheeling transactions. 
Loop flow, metering, planning and distribution problems 
could be corrected with legal, administrative and pricing 
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policies. Investment and new technologies could maintain the 
integrity of the local electric power system. 
C. RETAIL WHEELING ACTIVITIES AT THE STATE LEVEL 
Retail wheeling is generally not supported by legislation 
or regulatory policy (it is prohibited in seven states, 
discouraged in one and allowed in two [56]). The following list 
of retail wheeling activities conducted by states was compiled 
by Costello, Burns and Hegazy [25]: 
• Legislation for limited retail wheeling program (Nevada) . 
Retail wheeling could be ordered for a particular new type of 
industrial load (the legislation was enacted to attract a 
specific steel company to the state). 
• Comprehensive PUC Proposal (California) 
• Experimental PUC Program (Michigan) 
• Legislative investigation (New Mexico) 
• PUC rejection (Connecticut) 
• PUC formal investigation of wheeling and competition 
(Arizona, Maryland, Washington) 
• Gubernatorial investigation of retail_wheeling and regulatory 
reform (Delaware, Massachusetts) 
• PUC workshops and informal discussions (Illinois, Iowa, 
Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin) 
• Legislative rejection of proposed bills (Florida ,Ohio) 
The California and Michigan PUCs are leading the country 
in the implementation of retail wheeling with their activities. 
To get an idea on how the electric power market could be 
I 
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restructured, the main points of the California PUC Proposal and 
the Michigan Experimental PUC program will be presented. 
1. California PUC Proposal ("Blue Book") [57, 58,59] 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) issued a 
comprehensive proposal (known as the "Blue Book") to restructure 
California's electric industry (April 20, 1994). The "Blue 
Book" proposed that customers could choose whether to continue 
receiving bundled services (power and ancillary services) from 
their host utilities or to obtain retail wheeling (also called 
"direct access"). According to the proposal, large electric 
customers were scheduled to obtain "direct access" by January 1, 
1996. Smaller electric customers would progressively be phased 
in until all customers have "direct access" by January 1, 2002. 
Hearings on the "Blue Book" (which were conducted from 
June to October 1994), revealed that several issues had to be 
resolved before "direct access" could be implemented. For this 
reason, in May 24, 1995, the CPUC issued an order requesting 
comments on two policies ("Poolco" and "Direct Access"). 
a) Order Highlights (May 24, 1995) 
The important points of the order are the following: 
• CPUC advocates the establishment of a "Poolco", while the 
"Direct Access" policy is left as an alternative. Comments 
from interested parties on both policies are requested before 
issuing a final decision in January 1, 1996. 
• California's investor-owned-utilities (IOUs) would be 
functionally separated into transmission, distribution, and 
generation functions. 
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• Access to transmission services would be opened to all power 
suppliers. 
• Stranded costs would be recovered through a Competitive 
Transition Charge (CTC). 
• Utilities should continue to provide stranded benefits (e.g. 
social programs, energy efficiency programs, renewable energy 
programs, etc.). Funding could be obtained from a surcharge 
on electric bills. 
b) "Pool.co" Pol.icy 
The "Poolco" would be a central wholesale pool, run by an 
independent party. California IOUs (Southern California Edison, 
San Diego Gas & Electric, and Pacific Gas & Electric) would have 
to join the pool, while municipally-owned utilities and other 
out-of-state utilities would be encouraged to join it. 
The "Poolco" would: (a) be a central marketplace for 
parties buying and selling electricity (b) establish a market-
clearing price for all electric energy based on an hourly (or 
half-hourly) auction (c) dispatch all electric generation 
resources in an economically efficient manner and (d) ensure and 
maintain system reliability. 
The "Poolco" Policy would allow customers to: 
• Obtain "Virtual Direct Access" - customers would be able to 
control their electricity usage and cost. To obtain this, 
customers would need: 
Real-time electric meters (that allow them to track their 
electricity consumption). 
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The "Poolco" electricity clearing price. 
Time-of-use electric rates that would encourage them to 
use electricity during off-peak hours. 
Customers would try to shift their electric consumption 
to the period in which electricity is cheaper than the 
Poolco's clearing price. In this way, customers would reduce 
their electricity cost and utilities would reduce the need to 
build new generating plants or have large generating reserves 
during the peak hours. 
• Establi$h "Contracts for differences" - these contracts 
would allow customers to enter into financial contracts with 
generators, marketers, and brokers to fix electric power 
prices. 
(1) Implementation Steps 
The following briefly describes the CPUC's proposed 
implementation steps for the ·"Poolco" policy: 
1. Establish open access to transmission services. 
2. Unbundle the functions of generation, transmission and 
distribution. All generation and transmission facilities 
would be under the control of the "Poolco". 
3. Establish the "Poolco" by January 1, 1997. 
4. Request comments on the need to address market power of the 
"Poolco" members (since members with large market power could 
manipulate the price of electricity) . 
5. Develop methods to recover stranded costs. 
. . ---
6. Continue providing social programs, energy efficiency 
programs, and energy diversity and renewable energy goals 
currently being carried out by the utilities. 
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7. Install real-time metering capability for electric customers. 
This is planned to start by January 1 of 1997 (for large 
customers) and finish by January 1, 2003 (all customers). 
8. Establish "direct access" between end-user consumers and 
generators once the CPUC has resolved all issues. This is 
expected to occur by January 1, 1999. 
2. ~chigan Experimental PUC Program [60,61,62,63,64,65] 
On April 11, 1994, The Michigan Public Service Commission 
(MPSC) ordered a five-year, experimental retail wheeling program 
for the customers of Detroit Edison and Consumers Power Co. A 
limited experiment was considered to determine if retail 
wheeling would benefit the public. The experiment is focused on 
the administrative and technical feasibility of retail wheeling 
and not on industry restructuring and regulatory reform issues. 
Detroit Edison challenged the MPSC's authority to order 
the experiment with a filing before the US District Court for 
the Western District of Michigan. However, on August 26, 1994, 
both Detroit Edison and Consumers Power filed retail wheeling 
tariff proposals with MPSC. 
The Michigan experimental PUC program: 
• Limits the program to 60 MW for Consumers Power and 90 MW for 
Detroit Edison. 
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• Limits a customer's wheeling capacity to between 2 and 10 MW 
at each location served under the tariff. No single customer 
may acquire more than 75 MW. 
• Is available only to customers served at transmission or 
subtransmission voltage. 
• Places responsibility for wheeled power purchases on the 
wheeling customers. 
• Requires third-party power generators to obtain a Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity from the MPSC. They would also 
be required to obtain a franchise from the municipality where 
the customer is located. 
• Becomes effective only when Consumers Power or Detroit Edison 
need new capacity (to avoid stranded investment) . 
• Permits participant customers to return to full utility 
service, on the same term available to customers who did not 
participate, after the experiment ends. 
Participant customers who choose to return to full bundled 
service before the end of the experiment will have to pay any 
incremental fixed or variable power costs and take interruptible 
service. The experiment is considered an unbundling of rates 
for existing firm retail sales service. Detroit Edison and 
Consumers Power Co. would deliver purchased power to their 
retail customers from suppliers that are connected or can 
connect to their grids. 
CHAPTER V 
RETAIL WHEELING AND PSEUDO-RETAIL WHEELING 
ACTIVITIES AND INITIATIVES 
A. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF ACTIVITIES AND INITIATIVES 
The activities and initiatives presented in this chapter 
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involve industrial customers switching, partially or completely, 
from their host utility to another power supplier. The time 
period reviewed started from the signature of EPAct (1992) up to 
the present. 
B. TYPES OF ACTIVITIES AND INITIATIVES 
Although most of the states' legislation do not allow 
retail wheeling, the electric retail power market is in 
transition to complete deregulation. For this reason, most of 
the reviewed activities and initiatives are not "pure" retail 
wheeling but involve a degree of customer choice of its power 
supplier. These types of activities and initiatives (which will 
be called "pseudo-retail wheeling") will also be presented in 
this chapter to help understand what changes have occurred and 
what could occur in the electric power market at the retail 
level. 
To facilitate the understanding of these changes, these 
activities and initiatives will be grouped into three types: 
• "Retail" wheeling - a customer buys power from a supplier 
while the host utility provides the transmission service. 
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• ~Buy-sell" - the host utility is the broker (buys power from 
other supplier and sells it to the customer) in the wheeling 
transaction. 
• Dedicated line wheeling - a customer receives power from 
another supplier through a dedicated transmission line. 
C. SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The main sources of information used to search for these 
types of activities and initiatives were publications from: (a) 
the Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) [66] and (b) 
the National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI) [67]. Both 
groups are advocates of retail wheeling. Journals, periodical 
articles, and several publications related to the electric power 
market were also reviewed for other activities and initiatives 
and will be referenced as needed. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Information from the sources referenced above was used to 
understand the selected activities and initiatives. More 
information on each selected activity was obtained by contacting 
representatives of the involved parties (power supplier, 
customer, or state PUC). These representatives were also asked 
for an opinion on the factors that affected the success of their 
activity and suggestions for other companies seeking to obtain 
retail wheeling. The information presented in this chapter is 
public domain. 
E. WHEELING ACTIVITIES .AND INITIATIVES 
1 . "Retail Wheeling" Activities and Ini tia ti ves 
a) Bonneville Power Administration (host uti~ity) and Direct 
Service Industries, Inc. (customer) 
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The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is a federal 
agency that transmits and sells hydroelectric power in seven 
states of the US Pacific northwest region, supplying electricity 
to 170 utilities and numerous large industrial customers. 
Eleven of these industrial, electric-intensive customers form a 
group called Direct Service Industries (DSI). The situation of 
DSI members is unique because by federal law they are considered 
wholesale customers. 
In January 1993, BPA and DSI reached an agreement to cut 
back the amount of delivered electricity by 25 percent 
increments. BPA would broker power for DSI when it can not 
supply service [68]. 
Currently, BPA is voluntarily negotiating with DSI 
customers access to other power suppliers. It is expected that 
by October 1995, some DSI customers would be buying non-firm 
power from other suppliers (including BPA) with BPA providing 
the transmission service. The wheeled power would be used in 
addition to the power supplied by BPA. It is probable that BPA 
would also provide emergency power to DSI customers who are 
involved in these types of transactions [69]. 
iiiiiiiliiliii~~ 
b) Consolidated Edison (bost util.ity) and some industrial 
customers of Consolidated Edison 
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Consolidated Edison (ConEd) has an exclusive franchise 
(with some exceptions set by state legislation) for the sale of 
electricity in New York City and most of Westchester County 
[70] . The New York Power Authority (NYPA) is a public wholesale 
power supplier that owns generation and transmission facilities 
throughout the state of New York. NYPA's electric rates are 
lower than ConEd's rates at least partially because it is a 
state agency and does not have to pay state taxes. 
Under the 1987 state legislation, private-sector companies 
can access NYPA's power in situations that involve expansion, 
job retention or job revitalization. In cases of job retention, 
the applicant must demonstrate that there is a possibility that 
it will leave the state. Prospective customers must apply for 
NYPA's "economic development power" to the State Economic 
Development Power Allocation Board. NYPA helps these customers 
during the application process. 
Currently, NYPA supplies approximately 12% of ConEd load. 
The electric load of customers supplied with "economic 
development power" ranges from hundreds of kW to several 
thousands of MW. Selected customers buy power from NYPA while 
ConEd provides the transmission service at rates set by the New 
York Public Service Commission [71]. 
c) City of Co~umbia Water and Light Uti~ity (host uti~ity) 
and University of Missouri (customer) 
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The University of Missouri (UM), which is an electric 
customer of the City of Columbia Water and Light utility (City 
of Columbia), has a cogeneration plant capable of supplying the 
entire electric load of the university (approximately 35 
MW) [72]. 
UM can generate electricity at low cost ($24 /MWh on-peak 
and $20 /MWh off-peak). This gave UM leverage on its 
negotiations with the City of Columbia to obtain first, 
discounted electric rates and later, a voluntary retail wheeling 
agreement. A power marketer (Enron), and the City of Columbia 
are involved in retail wheeling transaction, providing up to 10 
MWh per hour of non-firm power to UM. 
d) Pub~ic Service Co. of New Hampshire (host uti~ity) and 
Freedom E~ectric Power (supp~ier) 
In August of 1994, Freedom Electric Power Co. filed an 
application with the New Hampshire PUC for permission to 
purchase low cost wholesale electricity from suppliers outside 
New Hampshire and resell it to some of Public Service Co. of New 
Hampshire (PSNH)'s customers [73,74,75,76]. Freedom plans to 
pay PSNH for line usage and then deliver electricity to large, 
transmission-level industrial customers. Freedom officials have 
said that it could save some industrial users 30 percent in 
annual electricity costs. PSNH's electric rates averaged 9.19 
¢/kWh while the industry average was 5.03 ¢/kWh. Under state 
law, electric utilities do not have exclusive franchise 
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territories and an alternative supplier can serve a customer of 
an existing utility if the PUC considers it in the public good. 
The application is still being reviewed by the State PUC and a 
decision is expected soon. If the application is approved, 
Freedom would be considered a utility and FERC regulations for 
wholesale transactions could be applied to it. The issue is 
whether Freedom activities qualify it as a utility according to 
state law or not [77]. 
e) Nationa1 Stee1 Corporation of Mishawaka (customer) 
The National Steel Corporation of Mishawaka (National), 
which has four facilities located in different states, has 
approached their host utilities with proposals for an 
experimental form of retail wheeling [78]. The size of their 
electrical load (varies from 40 to 200 MW) and the utilities' 
willingness to learn about retail wheeling facilitate the 
negotiations of these proposals. 
It has been reported that National reached an agreement 
with Illinois Power to establish a retail wheeling tariff for 
one of its facilities, with rates set by the Illinois Municipal 
Electric Agency in 1994. No documents have been filed at the 
state PUC yet. As an example, a representative from National 
Steel, said that he estimated the average cost of wheeled power 
from 3.5 to 3.7 ¢/kWh, which would be less than their present 
electric cost. 
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2. "Buy-Se11" Act.iv.it.ies and :In.it.iat.ives 
a) PS:I Energy (host uti~ity) and NuCor :Inc. (customer) 
NuCor has a steel manufacturing plant located in 
Crawfordsville, Indiana and is one of PSI Energy (PSI)'s largest 
electric power customers. PSI and NuCor signed a contract with 
the following features [79,80,81]: 
• Contract is valid through year 2009, with automatically 
renewable 5 year terms after this period. A five year notice 
prior to the end of each term is required to terminate this 
contract. 
• NuCor must purchase 150 MWh per hour of firm power from PSI. 
• NuCor can purchase up to 50 MWh per hour of non-firm power 
(above the 150 MWh of firm energy) from other suppliers [82]. 
• PSI would broker these transactions. 
• Rates and charges consist of: 
A transmission charge of 0.88 $/kW-mo. 
PSI's costs incurred in the transaction multiplied by a 
factor of 1.13 
Transaction fees 
A transmission tariff (Rider 19), based on the contract 
negotiated with NuCor has been approved by the Indiana Utility 
Regulatory Commission. This tariff will allow PSI's largest 
industrial and commercial customers to shop around for cheaper 
power, using PSI as a broker. Up to now, NuCor is the only 
customer under this tariff. 
b) Mohave Electric Cooperative (host uti~ity) and North Star 
Steel (customer) 
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North Star Steel (NSS) selected a site in Arizona (Mohave 
county) for the construction of steel recycling plant. This 
plant will be electric-intensive since it will use an electric 
furnace to recycle scrap steel. The plant, which is still under 
construction and would probably start operations by 1997, is 
expected to create 150 new jobs [83,84]. 
To attract NSS to Arizona, several incentives were given 
to NSS: (a) exemption from property taxes on the site for 20 
years, (b) exemption from sales taxes on purchased electricity 
for 15 years and (c) the ability to shop around for electric 
power. 
The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) is a federal 
agency that distributes hydroelectric power in the southwestern 
US; Arizona Electric Power Cooperative Inc. (AEPCO) is a 
generation and transmission utility. Mohave Electric 
Cooperative (Mohave), is a local power distributor in the 
plant's area and is a member of AEPCO. 
In October 1994, the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) 
approved an agreement, valid through year 2010, between Mohave, 
AEPCO, WAPA and NSS to provide a maximum of 80 MWh per hour of 
non-firm power to NSS. Mohave will sell power to NSS. This 
power will be bought from AEPCO who will, in turn, obtain it 
from a supplier chosen by NSS. WAPA will provide the 
transmission service to AEPCO and will construct a switching 
station and interconnection facilities. 
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The energy would be provided when available, and could be 
canceled instantaneously. For emergency requirements, the plant 
is expected to install a 1.5 MW natural gas electricity 
generator. The monthly non-firm energy charge would consist of: 
• AEPCO's actual incurred costs for purchasing, transmitting 
and scheduling energy (multiplied by a factor of 1.15) 
• AEPCO's actual incremental cost of generation (multiplied by 
a factor of 1.15) 
• Charges billed to AEPCO by Western 
• Mohave's actual costs as a result of all agreements 
NSS's electric cost savings from this agreement are 
estimated in $5/ton of raw steel (plant capacity is 500,000 
ton/yr) compared to more conventional methods [85). 
c) Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (host; ut;il.i"ty) 
In February 1995, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG&E) filed 
a wheeling proposal that is still under consideration at the 
California PUC. PG&E would offer voluntary retail wheeling in 
exchange for the opportunity to negotiate a discounted 
generation price with its large industrial customers [86) . 
The proposal consists in the following: 
• Depending on the annual average demand of a customer, it 
would be eligible according to the following schedule: 
Annual Average Starting 
Demand (kW) Year 
> 7500 1996 
> 4000 1997 
> 2000 1998 
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• Eligible customers would select a supplier (including PG&E) 
and negotiate with PG&E a confidential "buy-sell" agreement. 
Then, PG&E would buy power at the negotiated price and resell 
it to the customer. 
• Charges to the customer would consist on PG&E's bundled 
tariff, but with PG&E's generation cost replaced by the 
negotiated "buy-sell" generation price. PG&E's generation 
cost component would be obtained from avoided-costs used to 
set Qualifying Facilities payments. 
With this proposal, PG&E would be able to compete with 
other suppliers for the customer's purchase without pricing 
regulatory constraints. 
3. Dedicated Line Wheeling Activities and Initiatives 
a) Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (bost uti~ity) and A1can Rolled 
Products Inc. (customer) 
Alcan Rolled Products {Alcan), located in New York, is one 
of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.'s (NiMo) largest electric 
customers [87,88]. Sithe Energies Inc. constructed a 1040 MW-
cogeneration facility (called "Independence Station") in Oswego 
County, New York. Alcan, NiMo and the New York Power Authority 
(NYPA), are neighbors of the Independence Station. 
According to PURPA and state law, a qualifying 
cogenerating facility can sell electricity through a dedicated 
line to an on-site user [89]. Although Alcan and the 
Independence Station do not satisfy this "on-site requirement", 
the New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) approved Sithe to 
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sell electricity directly to Alcan because it was in the "public 
interest" (Alcan is a large industrial customer that was 
considering leaving the state) [90,91]. This is an important 
decision for the New York utility industry because is the first 
time a retail customer will be permitted to buy its electricity 
from a non-utility generator (NUG). 
Sithe has signed long-term contracts to sell: 
• Steam and electricity (44 MW) to Alcan through a dedicated 
transmission line (this contract is for 22 years). 
• Electricity to ConEd and NiMo. 
Sithe is also planning to provide electricity to a 
proposed cardboard recycling plant (Liberty Co.) which will be 
built in Sithe's property (estimated load: 15 MW). Alcan would 
obtain savings since Sithe's electric rate is 4.46 ¢/kWh, 
compared to NiMo's rate of 8 ¢/kWh [90]. In January of 1994, 
Alcan's savings were estimated in $5 to $7 million compared to 
NiMo's best oft"er to that date [89]. The NYPSC ordered Sithe 
to pay an "entry fee" of $19.6 million over a 10-year period to 
compensate NiMo for the loss of Alcan as customer. 
b) Texas-New Mexi.co Power (host; ut;i~it;y) and Amoco 
Corporation at Texas City (customer) 
In February 1995, Gulf Coast Power Connect Inc. (Gulf), 
filed with the Public Utility Commission of Texas for permission 
to build a 138 kV transmission line to connect Amoco facilities 
in Texas City. These two facilities are being served by Texas-
New Mexico Power. A decision on this issue is expected by the 
end of this year [92]. The proposed transmission line will 
connect the Amoco's Texas City refinery to an Amoco's chemical 
plant located less than 200 ft away. 
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Using the common carrier concept (similar to natural gas 
pipelines), Gulf will offer transmission services to customers 
who have power in one place and could use it in another. These 
are considered wholesale transactions [93]. According to Gulf's 
proposal, a customer would purchase a specific amount of 
capacity on the line and pay for it whether or not it is used. 
The rate will be based on the cost of the line and the number of 
customers using it. 
Gulf also filed for a permission to build another 
transmission line to transport cogeneration power from one Exxon 
facility to another. These facilities are customers of Houston 
Lighting & Power (HL&P). 
CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS OF RETAIL .AND PSEUDO-RETAIL WHEELING 
ACTIVITIES .AND INITIATIVES 
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A. SITUATIONS THAT HELP INCREASE CUSTOMERS' ABILITY TO CHOOSE 
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLIER 
The cases presented in Chapter five were analyzed to 
identify situations that helped customers obtain retail or 
pseudo-retail wheeling transactions. These principles thus 
identified should prepare other customers for retail wheeling. 
The principles are listed and explained below: 
• State economic development incentives 
Some states provide special incentives to companies that 
help develop the economy within the state by creating or 
keeping jobs. These incentives regarding retail wheeling 
help reduce the electricity cost of these companies, 
encouraging them to locate or remain in the state. 
These incentives could consist of: accessibility to 
cheap electric power (e.g., NYPA's "economic development 
power"), electricity sales tax exemptions, rate discounts, 
and the ability to shop around for electric power and others 
special agreements. Although large customers are likely to 
obtain these incentives, some of them are not restricted to 
large customers (e.g., NYPA's "economic development power"). 
This situation can be seen in the following cases: 
Consolidated Edison and some industrial customers of 
Consolidated Edison (p.53), Mohave Electric Cooperative and 
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North Star Steel (p.57), Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. and Alcan 
Rolled Products Inc. (p.59). 
• Partnerships between customer and host utility 
Most of the cases presented in Chapter five present a 
degree of partnership between the customer and host utility. 
In these partnerships, usually set with long-term contracts 
(5 to 10 years), customers obtain transmission service, rate 
discounts or brokering of "buy-sell" transactions from the 
host utility. Since transmission access for retail wheeling 
transactions is not regulated and customers have little 
experience with this type of transaction, customers could 
benefit from these partnerships. Utilities gain by getting 
broker fee, transmission fees and keeping the customer in the 
area. 
This situation can be seen in the following activities: 
City of Columbia Water and Light Utility and University of 
Missouri (p.54), National Steel Corporation of Mishawaka 
(p.55), PSI Energy and NuCor Inc. (p.56), Mohave Electric 
Cooperative and North Star Steel (p.57), Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. (p.58). 
• Utilities trying to obtain a competitive edge in the future 
retail market 
Although most of the players in the electric power 
market (electric utilities, NUGs, power marketers, 
regulators, etc.) agree that the retail power market is going 
to be deregulated, there is uncertainty on the contents of 
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the deregulation and when it would happen. The current 
"regulatory compact" gives utilities monopoly over a 
franchised area. Yet, some utilities are proposing limited 
retail wheeling experiments, special rates and "buy-sell" 
agreements to large industrial customers. 
I 
i 
Utilities engage in this type of activities to obtain a 
competitive edge by: (a) learning how to work in a 
competitive retail market (they do not have the experience 
since they were treated as monopolies), (b) having the 
opportunity to restructure their organizations ahead of other 
utilities (according to their vision of the market) and (c) 
having the opportunity to move state regulations in a 
direction beneficial to the utilities. 
This ~ituation can be seen in the following activities: 
National Steel Corporation of Mishawaka (p.55), PSI Energy 
and NuCor Inc. (p.56), Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (p.58). 
• Customers with large electric loads 
Retail wheeling experiments (e.g., the Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. initiative, and Michigan's limited retail 
wheeling experiment) and the California's "Blue Book" 
proposal define schedules for customer eligibility based on 
electric load size. Large customers would be involved in 
these activities first followed by smaller customers years 
later. This is done to implement the change at a smaller 
scale (there are fewer large industrial customers) and obtain 
the necessary expertise to. implement retail wheeling at a 
larger scale. 
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• Customers with "bypass" capability 
Large-electric-load customers with "bypass" capability 
can self-generate electricity (usually through cogeneration) 
or are planning to close operations and move to other state. 
Utilities facing the possibility of loosing these customers 
(if they exercise their "bypass" capability) are willing to 
provide them with "buy-sell" agreements, brokering or 
transmission services. In "buy-sell" agreements, host 
utilities not only provide transmission services, but they 
are also potential power suppliers. 
This situation can be seen in the following activities: 
Bonneville Power Administration and Direct Service 
Industries, Inc. (p.52), City of Columbia Water and Light 
Utility and University of Missouri (p.54), Public Service Co. 
of New Hampshire and Freedom Electric Power (p.54), National 
Steel Corporation of Mishawaka (p.55), PSI Energy and NuCor 
Inc. (p.56), Mohave Electric Cooperative and North Star Steel 
(p.57), Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. and Alcan Rolled Products 
Inc. (p.59). 
• Customers located close to alternative power suppliers build 
their own transmission line 
In the Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. and Alcan Rolled 
Products Inc. case (p.59), a customer located close to an 
alternative power supplier (a Qualifying Cogeneration 
Facility) built a transmission line to obtain power from it, 
bypassing the host utility. Because customers "bypass" 
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completely their host utility, this situation is the opposite 
of establishing a partnership with the utility. In the 
Niagara Mohawk case, the host utility was compensated for the 
stranded costs originated from the departure of the customer. 
• Building transmission lines to interconnect facilities 
Companies with facilities located close to each other 
could build interconnecting transmission lines to transmit 
electric power from one facility to the other. This 
situation is presented in the Texas-New Mexico Power and 
Amoco Corporation at Texas City case (p.60). 
• Customers that can operate with non-firm power 
It was not possible to determine if all the cases 
presented in Chapter five involve non-firm power due to 
confidentiality requirements and the present development 
status in some of them. It seems that customers involved in 
agreements negotiated with their host utilities can operate 
with non-firm power at a certain degree. To satisfy their 
requirements for firm power, customers would: 
contract backup power from their host utility (e.g. 
Bonneville Power Administration and Direct Service 
Industries, Inc., p.52), 
buy a minimum amount of firm-power from their host utility 
(e.g., PSI Energy and NuCor Inc., p.56), or 
have capacity to self-generate power to supply their whole 
load or a minimum "emergency" load (e.g. City of Columbia 
Water and Light Utility and University of Missouri, p.54 
and Mohave Electric Cooperative and North Star Steel, 
p.57). 
• Other situations[94] 
Other situations that could play an important role in 
other cases (in which customers have a choice of power 
supplier) are the following: 
DSM programs - utilities could prefer transmitting power 
from other suppliers instead of constructing new 
generation plants. By avoiding the construction of new 
plants, utilities avoid increasing their potential 
stranded investments. 
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Low load factor customers - low load factor customers have 
a peak demand much higher than their average demand. 
Because utilities have an "obligation to serve", they must 
commit generation reserves enough to supply the customer's 
peak demand. By transmitting power from other suppliers, 
utilities could reduce committed generating reserves, thus 
reducing their operating costs and avoid constructing new 
generation plants. 
Low profit and unstable customers - it could be more 
profitable for utilities to transmit power from another 
supplier instead of providing power and "bundled" services 
to these customers. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of the recommendations developed in this 
chapter is to provide potential retail wheelers with the issues 
that could be important for retail wheeling. These 
recommendations were classified in two types: 
• Recommendations for customers in a non-deregulated retail 
power market. 
• General recommendations (for both non-deregulated and 
deregulated retail power markets). 
1. Methodo1ogy 
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Some of the recommendations developed in this chapter are 
based on the opinions of representatives from the companies 
involved in the cases presented in Chapter five while others are 
based on observations of the case studies. A survey was 
developed in an attempt to validate the recommendations 
developed in this chapter and to obtain other points of view. A 
total of 21 survey participants were identified from: 
• Representatives of companies involved in retail and pseudo-
retail wheeling transactions (cases presented in Chapter 
five). 
• Energy managers of some large electric customers (industrial 
and commercial) across the US. 
a) Survey Description 
The survey (a survey sample is presented in Appendix A and 
the exemption from the Oklahoma State University Institutional 
Review Board is presented in Appendix B), was divided in two 
sections: 
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• The first section presented the recommendations developed in 
this chapter. Survey participants were asked to provide 
their comments and points of view on each recommendation. 
• The second section was open for ideas and other points of 
view that the survey participants thought could also be 
important in a retail wheeling market. 
The names of the survey participants were kept 
confidential. 
b) Results 
The four responses received ~re from participants that 
belong to a utility, a law firm and potential retail wheeling 
customers. 
2. Recommendations and Survey Results 
The recommendations developed in this chapter and the 
summarized survey responses for each recommendation are 
presented below. 
a) Recommendations for Customers in a non-deregulated Retail 
Power Market 
The following recommendations should help customers in a 
non-deregulated retail power market (which is the present status 
of deregulation in the US) obtain some of the benefits of retail 
wheeling before deregulation occurs. 
• Establish partnerships with the host utility to obtain retail 
wheeling sooner 
Current market developments show that some utilities are 
willing to establish partnerships with customers for 
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transactions that resemble retail wheeling. Since it is 
uncertain when deregulation will occur, by establishing 
partnerships, customers could obtain some of the benefits of 
retail wheeling before the retail market is deregulated. 
Customers would benefit from these partnerships by 
obtaining rate discounts, brokering of buy/sell transactions 
or transmission services. Utilities, on the other side, 
would benefit by learning how to work in a competitive 
environment and by keeping their current customers. 
For example, a large industrial customer could approach 
its utility to look for ways to reduce its electricity cost. 
Besides the need to have negotiating power, the customer 
could point out the competitive advantages that the utility 
would obtain if it engages in retail wheeling (or 
transactions that resemble retail wheeling) : learning to work 
in a competitive retail market, opportunity to restructure 
its organization and shap~ state regulations to benefit the 
utility~ Utilities also seem to like conducting these 
partnerships as experiments because they would have control 
over the restructuring process (it could be reversed if it 
does not work), the amount of restructuring, and an 
opportunity to try different approaches to address the issues 
of retail wheeling. 
Survey Comments 
* Electric utilities are already engaged in the equivalent 
of retail wheeling now. Discounts and buy/sell agreements 
are common (lawyer). 
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* Partnerships may not always work and "battling" the host 
utility could be the best approach. A non-willing host 
utility could set a long-term contract that requires years 
of prior notice before the customer could get out of it 
(utility). 
* Utilities "tend not to move this fast" (customer). 
* Partnerships encourage the creation of the deregulated 
market (customer). 
• Be prepared to negotiate transmission tariffs 
The "mega-NOPR" left the issue of retail stranded cost 
to the state PUCs. Before deregulation comes, retail 
customers should use transmission charges of past wholesale 
transactions or buy/sell agreements as a reference when 
negotiating transmission tariffs with utilities. 
The problem faced by several customers involved in 
transactions resembling retail wheeling is that transmission 
tariffs were not always available since utilities have been 
reluctant to publish this information. This would change 
with the operation of RTGs, which are expected to file 
wholesale regional transmission rates, which could be a 
source of information. 
Survey Comments 
* Electric utilities would file wholesale rates with the 
FERC or state PUCs. Real-time Information Networks (which 
are required by the "mega-NOPR") would likely be a better 
source of information than RTGs (lawyer). 
* With retail wheeling, there could be problems setting 
rates that differentiate firm power from power just 
passing through the lines. Also, customer could obtain 
lower rates if the transmission voltage is higher. In 
this case, the custome·r' s maintenance cost goes up 
(utility) . 
• Follow the development of the electric power market 
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Retail wheeling is a hot topic, and there is significant 
literature and articles that are being published on retail 
power market restructuring in specialized journals and 
magazines. Follow the developments on the leading retail 
wheeling activities (California's ~Blue Book", Michigan's 
retail wheeling experiment) as well as utility-initiated 
contracts and agreements in different states to see where the 
retail power market is he~ding. 
Survey Comments 
* It is better to hire an expert rather than having 
customers doing it by themselves (lawyer) . 
* This is important for customers willing to get into retail 
wheeling (generally those whose electric cost are high 
compared to their total operating cost) (utility). 
* This information is not as available as it should be 
(customer). 
* This is not enough since there is no way to predict how 
the market will develop (trends could change) (customer). 
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b) Genera1 Recommendations 
These recommendations should help potential retail 
wheelers (both in a deregulated and non-deregulated retail power 
market) get prepared for a retail wheeling market. 
• Analyze electric loads requirements 
Currently, host utilities supply customers with both 
firm power and ~bundled" (provided as a "package") ancillary 
services. There is no choice. In a deregulated market, 
customers would have access to firm power, non-firm 
(interruptible) power and "unbundled" ("individual") 
ancillary services provided by different suppliers. 
Non-firm power is cheaper than firm power but it could 
be interrupted when power is needed. Customers looking to 
reduce their electricity cost should consider buying non-firm 
power. For this, customers need to analyze the firmness 
requirements of their electric loads and determine which 
loads could operate with non-firm power, which ones need firm 
power, backup power, etc. 
Ancillary services (frequency regulation, load 
regulation, provision for reserves, scheduling and 
coordination of services, backup power, reactive power for 
voltage support) are currently provided as "bundled" services 
by host utilities. In an "unbundled" market, customers would 
be able to choose suppliers of ~unbundled" ancillary 
services, different than their host utility, that provide 




For example, a manufacturing plant determines that its 
firm loads consist of critical plant equipment (e.g., 
equipment cooling pumps and material handling equipment) and 
emergency lighting. Non-firm loads could be other 
manufacturing equipment, lighting, etc. Firm and non-firm 
loads need to be in separate circuits so that backup power 
(or firm power) could be supplied to the firm loads in case 
of power interruption. Backup power could be provided by the 
plant itself (or contracted from a supplier) to supply the 
plant loads if the interruption of power lasts longer than 
permissible. Reactive power for voltage support could also 
be provided by the plant itself. 
Survey Comments 
* By analyzing the different loads, customers could also 
obtain differentiated rates (from rate discounts provided 
by their host utility or from wheeled power) for their 
different needs (e.g. applying special riders or rates for 
backup power, non-firm power, Time-of-Use, firm power, 
etc.) (lawyer). 
* Most industrial users do not know where their electric 
power is used. Customers could break down their loads 
into: firm loads, critical loads, non-firm loads, the time 
of day when they occur. They could also analyze if their 
loads could be changed without jeopardizing the 
manufacturing process. Many of these loads could fit into 
rate riders or special programs (utility) . 
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* Customers need to know how to do this process (customer). 
* Determining the amount and type of power sources that 
minimize costs and risk of a customer is a big challenge. 
The simplest case consists in a customer that obtains 
power from its host utility and wants to install a "peak-
shaving" electric generator for its peak loads (since peak 
power is the most expensive, this would reduce the 
customer's electric cost). The problem is how to 
determine the optimal size of the "peak-shaving" 
generator. This problem could be extended to include 
other sources of power: firm power, cogeneration power, 
non-firm power, backup power (customer). 
• Determine power supply and ancillary services options in the 
region 
After analyzing their electric loads, customers would 
need to know the power supply and ancillary services options 
available in the region. With this information, for example, 
a plant could contract the following services from: 
Host utility: 80 MW of firm power, transmission service 
and some ancillary services tfrequency regulation, load 
regulation, scheduling and coordination of services, 
voltage support). 
Supplier A: 100 MW of non-firm power, and generation 
reserves (ancillary service). 
Customer: Backup power (e.g. cogeneration plant). 
Power supply and ancillary services options could be 
determined by contacting: 
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Consultants - they could perform a power flow analysis on 
the regional grid to calculate power flow constraints and 
determine the possible routes for power flow. Information 
needed to perform this analysis would be available from 
FERC's Form 715 filings[95]. Consultants with this 
expertise usually have experience working at the utilities 
in the local region. 
Power marketers - most of them have experience with the 
deregulated natural gas market. They would have the 
expertise necessary to determine possible routes for power 
flow, identifying potential power suppliers and setting up 
power transactions. Power marketers could be contacted 
through the Power Marketing Association (PMA) [96]. 
Potential suppliers - customers could issue Requests For 
Proposals (RFPs) for power supply to utilities, power 
marketers and NUGs in the region. 
For example, in 1994, the University of Missouri (UM) 
issued an RFP for power supply[97]. In this particular 
RFP, suppliers had to: {a) offer delivered prices at 
levels guaranteed to be below UM's electricity cost, {b) 
demonstrate financial capabilities to make such 
guarantees, and (c) be credible power suppliers of the 
quantities and qualities required by UM. 
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Host utilities - most of the utilities have been involved 
in wholesale transactions and thus, should have the 
expertise necessary for setting up retail wheeling 
transactions. Once the customer establishes a partnership 
(or if retail wheeling is regulated), it could approach 
the host utility to determine potential suppliers of power 
in the region. Utilities would probably set up power 
marketing departments for this type of transactions. 
RTGs - these are expected to file regional transmission 
pricing systems and set up region-wide-wholesale power 
trading systems. Although RTGs were conceived to deal 
with wholesale level transactions, these trading systems 
could probably be extended to include retail level 
transactions. 
Survey Comments 
* In the long run, all electric utilities will be offering 
these services. But, as the deregulated natural gas 
market shows, certain services (e.g. reliability and power 
quality) can only be obtained from host utilities since 
they (and not the consultants or marketers) operate the 
system (utility). 
* Some companies are trying to create a network of 
interested parties to encourage cooperation (customer). 
• Locate new facilities in locations with cheap supply of 
electric power 
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A deregulated market would create new options for 
companies seeking to build facilities with cheap supply of 
electric power. Potential locations for new facilities would 
be found after conducting a study on power supply options on 
the region. Examples of these locations could be: areas 
close to NUGs (a transmission line to connect the facility to 
the NUGs might also need to be built, which requires approval 
from the state PUC), industrial parks supplied by 
cogeneration facilities (in areas where electric power is 
expensive), and areas served by utilities willing to transmit 
or buy power from other suppliers. 
Survey Comments 
* Customers must be careful to assure power supply 
flexibility with a short penalty (stranded costs) in the 
long run (lawyer). 
* This only applies to energy-intensive users~ Customers 
should also consider costs of transportation, labor, 
taxes, etc. (utility, customer). 
• Form groups of customers to increase negotiating power 
Current developments in the power market show that large 
customers get the benefits from a deregulated power market 
before smaller customers do. Small to medium-sized 
industrial customers (in particular, those fed by the same 
substation or bus) could form groups to increase their 
negotiating power in transactions and negotiations with 
utilities. These groups could be similar to municipalities 
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and school districts[98] (municipalities are treated by EPAct 
as wholesale customers) which are already seeking approval 
for retail wheeling transactions in the state of New York. 
The negotiating power of these groups would increase if 
they are considered a single customer since their electric 
loads would add. Most these groups do not have "bypass" 
capacity, so they would probably not obtain retail wheeling 
(or transactions that resemble retail wheeling) unless state 
PUCs approve these transactions (or issue the appropriate 
legislation) or these groups develop "bypass" capacity. 
For example, customers at an industrial park could 
approach their host utility as a group ("the industrial 
park"), instead of individually, to have more power in 
negotiating access to other power suppliers. The possibility 
of installing a cogeneration plant to supply the entire 
industrial park should be considered since this would 
increase the park's "bypass" capacity and provide it with 
backup power in case of power curtailment. Finally, thermal 
energy could also be supplied to the companies in the 
industrial park. 
Survey Comments 
* The market would probably need to be completely 
deregulated at the retail level before this happens. 
Electricity buyer cooperatives are possible, but they 
could be considered to be regulated utilities under some 
state laws (lawyer) . 
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* The problem is that sometimes, the members of these groups 
do not agree on what's best for the group (utility, 
customer) . 
* These groups could probably not have much negotiating 
power. It could be easier if they improve their processes 
first (e.g. energy efficiency) (customer). 
• Consider the use of financial instruments to hedge risk 
Electric power would become a commodity in a deregulated 
market. Utilities, cogenerators, financial houses and others 
are forming Independent Power Marketers affiliates. 
Financial instruments (or "derivatives") would provide risk 
management opportunities to the different players for the 
power market (IOUs, NUGs, retail customers). Some of the 
derivatives that could be created in the next years are: 
Forward contracts - agreements for delivery of power in 
the future for a period of time. 
Electricity futures - standardized contract traded on an 
exchange. The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) is 
planning a contract for electricity futures. 
Electric rate swaps - a customer buying power at a fixed 
rate and another buying power at a variable rate (e.g. 
based on marginal cost), could swap their rates (or part 
of them). This is done when the risk profiles of the 
customers do not match their electric rate. 
Options - contracts in which a fee is paid for the right 
to enter into a forward contract. 
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The Association of Power Marketers could help customers 
choose the appropriate derivative for their needs. Once 
NYMEX starts working with electricity futures, it is expected 
that the use of derivatives will become more common in the 
electric industry. 
Survey Comments 
* Financial instruments are proper for mature markets and 
they are still far off for electricity (lawyer) . 
* These may help some customers, but their use depend on how 
the market develops (utility) . 
* Financial instruments are for "sophisticated" users. They 
may require a lot of investment of t1me and money 
(customer). 
* These may work for large users that can invest in futures 
and options. In general, the commoditization of power 
could be limited due to the characteristics of electric 
power (customer). 
ADDITIONAL SURVEY COMMENTS 
Survey participants also provided the following comments: 
• The secrecy of rate discounts provided by utilities to some 
customers is a big issue. Utilities with market power like 
to keep rate discounts secret to reduce the risk of 
competition at the retail level. This helps them keep their 
market dominance while destroying competitive opportunities 
for retail customers. 
• The big issue is the deregulation of the electric market. 
Instead of retail wheeling, customers have less contentious 
ways to obtain the same benefits. For example, utilities 
provide rate discounts, but they oppose retail wheeling. 
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• A manual for retail wheeling customers would have to consider 
the different needs of retail customers. Negotiation 
techniques would have change for each type of customer 
because their needs vary tremendously. Recommendations could 
be grouped into those specific to different groups of 
customers: 
* Big load (flexible load) 
* Big load (inflexible load) 
* Moderate load 
* Small loads 
• Only time will tell if these recommendations are right. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The electric wholesale power market is presently being 
deregulated by FERC. FERC's final- regulation on transmission 
tariffs, comparability, and wholesale stranded costs would be 
issued by 1996. The next step would be the deregulation of the 
retail power market. State PUCs are still studying how to deal 
with the issues involved with the implementation of retail 
wheeling and have chosen to smooth. the transition to a 
deregulated retail market instead of implementing "pure" retail 
wheeling rapidly. 
The development of a retail wheeling scenario proved to be 
impractical. There are too many possibilities and none of the 
experts agree as to what might happen. 
Presently, some utilities and customers are involved in 
pseudo-retail wheeling transactions which would probably become 
more common in the next years, but ~'pure" retail wheeling 
transactions would only be available to only a few large 
electric customers. In summary, the most important 
characteristic of customers engaged in these types of 
transactions is their "negotiating power", which derives from 
the customer's electric load size and its "bypass" capability. 
This "negotiating power" allows customers to set up partnerships 
to obtain rate discounts, buy/sell agreements or retail wheeling 
transactions. Since small and medium-sized customers lack of 
"negotiating power", they would have to wait until state PUCs or 
their host utilities set up retail or pseudo-retail wheeling 
programs. 
Other factors that helped customers obtain these types of 
transactions are the following: 
States providing economic development incentives to 
customers. 
Utilities trying to obtain a competitive edge in the future 
retail market. 
Utilities implementing DSM programs. 
Customers located close to alternative power suppliers that 
build their own transmission line. 
customers that can operate with non-firm power. 
Customers that have low load factor. 
Customers that generate low profit to the utility and are 
unstable. 
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Customers do not need retail wheeling to reduce their 
electricity cost. Other less radical ways (e.g. rate discounts, 
special riders, buy/sell agreements) which are favored by 
utilities, can be used to obtain savings. Saving money to 
electric customers, and not retail wheeling is the final 
objective of this work. 
The responses from the survey do not validate the 
recommendations developed in this work. They reinforce them and 
provide other points of view. According to survey participants, 
the recommendations developed in this work seem to point the 
right direction on how to get prepared for retail wheeling. 
There is no certainty since it is unknown how the future 
electric retail power market would operate. These 
recommendations are summarized below: 
• Recommendations for customers in a non-deregulated Retail 
Power Market 
c Establish partnerships with the host utility to obtain 
retail wheeling sooner 
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Partnerships could be beneficial for both the customer and 
the utility. 
c Be prepared to negotiate transmission tariffs 
During the early stages of deregulation of the electric 
power market, retail customers would probably have to 
negotiate transmission rates based on past wholesale 
transactions, tariff filings and information from the 
utilities' Real-time Information Networks (RINs). As 
deregulation progresses, retail and pseudo-retail wheeling 
agreements, filed with the state PUCs, will be a source of 
information for other customers. 
c Follow the development of the electric power market 
Knowing what is occurring in the electric power market is 
important for customers that are willing to take the risks 
of retail wheeling. Small to medium-sized customers would 
probably have to hire consultants (engineers, power 
marketers, lawyers) to set up these types of transactions, 







These recommendation would help customers in a deregulated 
and non-deregulated retail power market. 
c Analyze electric loads requirements 
Customers need to know where the electricity is used in 
their facilities. Electric loads should be analyzed and 
separated into firm, critical, non-firm, time-of-use, etc. 
loads. Savings could be obtained by assigning them to 
discount rates, special riders, buy/sell or retail 
wheeling agreements. 
c Determine power supply and ancillary services options in 
the region 
Power supply and ancillary services options could be 
determined by contacting host utilities, RTGs, 
consultants, power marketers, or issuing RFPs to potential 
power suppliers. In a deregulated retail power market, 
some services would still have to be provided by the host 
utility to assure power quality and reliability. 
c Electric-intensive customers should locate new facilities 
in locations with cheap supply of electric power 
A deregulated market would create new options for 
electric-intensive customers seeking to build facilities 
with cheap supply of electric power. Customers should 
also consider the flexibility in choosing alternative 
power suppliers in that particular location. 
c Form groups of customers to increase negotiating power 
Ideally, small to medium-sized industrial customers could 
form groups to increase their negotiating, but 
deregulation of the retail power market would probably be 
required before this could happen. Experiences from the 
deregulated natural gas market show that groups will not 
work well unless the members have a common goal. 
c Consider the use of financial instruments to hedge risk 
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Depending on how the electric power market develops, 
electric power could become a commodity in the next years. 
Financial instruments would provide risk management 
opportunities to the different players for the power 
market, but, according to experiences in the deregulated 
natural gas market, they would probably only work for 
large customers willing to invest a lot of time and money. 
TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following topics should be given special consideration: 
• Publish the results of this work. This is a way of obtaining 
more comments and improving the quality of the 
recommendations presented in this work. 
• The electric market is changing fast. To maintain the 
principles presented in this work updated, it is important to 
review the latest regulation at the wholesale and retail 
level (FERC's NOPRs, Notices of Inquiry, state PUCs 
activities; e.g. California, ~ichigan and others). 
• In the next years, other retail wheeling and pseudo-retail 
wheeling activities will occur. Those cases will provide 
other principles for this work. 
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• The PMA encourages the use of financial instruments in a 
deregulated market. Although customers think that those are 
appropriate only for "large" electric customers, they could 
be wrong. The study of the development of these instruments 
(e.g. NYMEX, California's "contracts for differences", etc.) 
would show if these instruments would play an important 
factor in the deregulated market. 
• Information from FERC (regulation, technical information, 
etc.), and state PUCs is already available through the 
Internet and bulletin boards (some of the information 
presented in this work was obtained from these sources). 
These sources of information should be explored in more 
detail. These Internet sources could also be used to obtain 
more opinions and validate this work. 
• Finally, the best validation of this work would be to apply 
these concepts to a real case or to receive more feedback 
from customers, IPPs, utilities, power marketers and 
consultants. 
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SAMPLE OF COVER LETTER 1 
THIS IS SAMPLE OF THE COVER LEITER FOR THE SURVEY THAT WILL BE 
PROVIDED TO REPRESENTATIVES OF COMPANIES INVOLVED IN 
TRANSACTIONS THAT RESEMBLE RETAIL WHEELING 






My name is Javier A. Mont, member of the Oklahoma EADC/IAC, a group sponsored by the 
DOE that conducts Energy and Waste Management Assessments at industrial plants in the State 
of Oklahoma. 
As part of my MS thesis, I am working on developing a manual for industrial and commercial 
customers on issues that could be important in a retail wheeling market. I understand that retail 
wheeling is not defined yet, but my intention is to develop a list of recommendations as far as 
present developments ofthe electric power market allow. 
I am enclosing for your review: 
• List of recommendations (this list was developed from activities that resemble retail 
wheeling). See pages 1-4. 
• Explanation of the recommendations. See pages 5-8. 
• List of acronyms used in these recommendations. See page 9. 
Since you are involved this type of transactions, your contribution will be invaluable in this study. 
I would appreciate that you mail back to me any comments you had on these recommendations 
and suggest other issues that you consider would be important in a retail wheeling market. 
These comments and suggestions would be considered in my study. Any information that you 
provide will be kept confidential. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I am looking forward to hearing 
from you soon. 
Yours faithfully, 
Javier A. Mont 
Research Assistant, Oklahoma EADC/Industrial Assessment Center 
Oklahoma State University 
Department of Industrial Engineering & Management 
322EN 
Stillwater, OK 7 4078 
Phone: (405) 744-9146 
FAX: (405) 744-6187 
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SAMPLE OF COVER LETTER 2 
THIS IS SAMPLE OF THE COVER LETTER FOR THE SURVEY THAT WILL BE 
PROVIDED TO ENERGY MANAGERS OF SOME LARGE INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES 
ACROSS THE US 





My name is Javier A. Mont, member of the Oklahoma EADC/IAC, a group directed by Dr. 
Wayne C. Turner and sponsored by the DOE that conducts Energy and Waste Management 
Assessments at industrial plants in the State of Oklahoma. 
As part of my MS thesis, I am working on developing a manual for industrial and commercial 
customers on issues that could be important in a retail wheeling market. I understand that retail 
wheeling is not defined yet, but my intention is to develop a list of recommendations as far as 
present developments of the electric power market allow. 
As you know, retail wheeling would allow customers to buy electric power from any supplier and 
have it delivered through their host utility's transmission system. This can lead to large energy 
cost savings for industrial customers. 
I am enclosing for your review: 
• List of recommendations (this list was developed from activities that resemble retail 
wheeling). See pages 1-4. 
• Explanation of the recommendations. See pages 5-8. 
• List of acronyms used in these recommendations. See page 9. 
Since your company is the type of industry for which these recommendations were developed, I 
would appreciate that you mail back to me any comments or suggestions you had on these 
recommendations and suggest other issues that you consider would be important in a retail 
wheeling market. These comments and suggestions would be considered in my study. Any 
information that you provide will be kept confidential. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I am looking forward to hearing 
from you soon. 
Yours faithfully, 
Javier A. Mont 
Research Assistant, Oklahoma EADC/Industrial Assessment Center 
Oklahoma State University 
Department of Industrial Engineering & Management 
322EN 
Stillwater, OK 7 4078 
Phone: (405) 744-9146 




REVIEW THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, WRITE COMMENTS AND PROVIDE OTHER 
IDEAS. 
CONTACT ME IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. 
WHEN YOU FINISH, USE THE BUSINESS REPLY ENVELOPE TO SEND THE 
SURVEY BACK. 
UST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of these recommendations is to provide potential retail wheelers with the 
issues that could be important for retail wheeling. These recommendations were classified in 
two types: 
Recommendations for customers in a not deregulated retail power market. 
General recommendations. 
1. Recommendations for customers in a not deregulated retail power market 
Establish partnerships with your host utility to obtain retail wheeling sooner 
By establishing partnerships, customers could obtain the benefits of retail wheeling 
before the retail market is deregulated. Customers would obtain rate discounts, brokering of 
"buy-sen· transactions or transmission services. Utilities, on the other side, would benefit by 
learning how to work in a competitive environment and by keeping their current customers. 
COMMENTS: 
Be prepared to negotiate transmission tariffs 
Retail customers should use transmission charges of past wholesale transactions (or 
"buy-sen· agreements) as a reference when negotiating transmission tariffs with utilities. The 
problem is that up to now, utilities have been reluctant to publish this information. This would 
change with the operation of RTGs, which are expected to file wholesale regional transmission 
rates, and they could be contacted to obtain this information. 
COMMENTS: 
1 
Follow the development of the electric power market 
Follow the developments on the leading retail wheeling activities (California's "Blue 
Book·, Michigan's retail wheeling experiment) as well as utility-initiated contracts and 
agreements in different states to see where is the market heading. 
COMMENTS: 
2. General Recommendations 
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Analvze electric loads requirements 
To reduce their electricity cost, customers should analyze the firmness requirements of 
their electric loads and determine which loads could operate with non-firm power, which ones 
need firm power, backup power, etc. Customers should also analyze which ancillary services 
could be provided by suppliers different than their host utility. 
COMMENTS: 
Determine power supply and ancillarv services options in the region 
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Locate new facilities in locations with cheap supply of electric power 
Examples of these locations could be: areas close to NUGs (a transmission line to 
connect to the NUGs might also need to be built, which requires approval from the state PUC), 
industrial parks supplied by cogeneration facilities (in areas where electric power is expensive), 
and areas served by utilities willing to transmit power from other suppliers. 
COMMENTS: 
Form groups of customers to increase negotiating oower 
Small to medium-sized industrial customers (in particular, those fed by the same 
substation or bus} could form groups to increase their negotiating power in transactions and 
negotiations with utilities. 
COMMENTS: 
Consider the use of financial instruments to hedge risk 
The use of financial instruments (or "derivativesj would provide risk management 
opportunities to the different players for the power market (IOUs, NUGs, retail customers}. 
Some of the derivatives that could be created are: 
Forward contracts 
Electricity futures 







EXPLANATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of these recommendations is to provide potential retail wheelers with the 
issues that could be important for retail wheeling. These recommendations were classified in 
two types: 
Recommendations for customers in a not deregulated retail power market. 
General recommendations. 
Some of the following recommendations are based on the opinions and suggestions of 
representatives from the companies involved in the retail and pseudo-retail wheeling cases 
presented in Chapter 5, while others are based on personal philosophy. 
1. Recommendations for customers in a not deregulated retail power market 
The following recommendations should help customers in a not deregulated retail power 
market (this is present status of deregulation in the US) obtain the benefits of retail wheeling 
before deregulation occurs. 
Establish partnerships with the host utility to obtain retail wheeling sooner 
Current market developments show that some utilities are willing to establish 
partnerships with customers for transactions that resemble retail wheeling. Since it is uncertain 
when deregulation would occur, by establishing partnerships, customers could obtain some of the 
benefits of retail wheeling before the retail market is deregulated. 
Customers would benefit from these partnerships by obtaining rate discounts, brokering 
of "buy-sell" transactions or transmission services. Utilities, on the other side, would benefit by 
learning how to work in a competitive environment and by keeping their current customers. 
For example, a large industrial customer could approach its utility to look for ways to 
reduce its electricity cost. Besides the need to have negotiating power, the customer could point 
out the competitive advantages that the utility would obtain if it engages in retail wheeling (or 
transactions that resemble retail wheeling): learning to work in a competitive retail market, 
opportunity to restructure its organization and shape state regulation to benefit the utility. 
Utilities also seem to like conducting these partnerships as experiments because they would 
have: control over the restructuring process (it could be reversed if it does not work), the amount 
of restructuring, and an opportunity to try different approaches to address the issues of retail 
wheeling. 
Be prepared to negotiate transmission tariffs 
The "mega-NOPR" left the issue of retail stranded cost to the state PUCs. Before 
deregulation comes, retail customers should use transmission charges of past wholesale 
transactions or "buy-sell" agreements as a reference when negotiating transmission tariffs with 
utilities. 
The problem faced by several customers involved in transactions resembling retail 
wheeling is that transmission tariffs were not always available since utilities have been reluctant 
to publish this information. This would change with the operation of RTGs, which are expected 
to file wholesale regional transmission rates, which could be a source of information. 
Follow the development of the electric oower market 
Retail wheeling is a hot topic, and there is plenty of literature and articles that are being 
published on retail power market restructuring in specialized journals and magazines. 
Follow the developments on the leading retail wheeling activities (California's "Blue 
Book", Michigan's retail wheeling experiment) as well as utility-initiated contracts and 
agreements in different states to see where the retail power market is heading. 
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2. General Recommendations 
These recommendations should be help potential retail wheelers (both in a deregulated 
and not deregulated retail power market) get prepared for a retail wheeling market. 
Analyze electric loads requirements 
Currently, host utilities supply customers with both firm power and "bundled" (provided as 
a "packagej ancillary services. There is no choice. In a deregulated market, customers would 
have access to firm power, non-firm (interruptible) power and "unbundled" ("individualj ancillary 
services provided by different suppliers. 
Non-firm power is cheaper than firm power but it could be interrupted when power is 
needed. Customers looking to reduce their electricity cost should consider buying non-firm 
power. For this, customers need to analyze the firmness requirements of their electric loads and 
determine which loads could operate with non-firm power, which ones need firm power, backup 
power, etc. 
Ancillary services (frequency regulation, load regulation, provision for reserves, 
scheduling and coordination of services, backup power, reactive power for voltage support) are 
currently provided as "bundled· services by host utilities. In an "unbundled" market, customers 
would be able to choose suppliers of "unbundled" ancillary services, different than their host 
utility, that provide these services at lower cost and with the required reliability. 
For example, a manufacturing plant determines that its firm loads consist on critical plant 
equipment (e.g., equipment cooling pumps and material handling equipment) and emergency 
lighting. Non-firm loads could be other manufacturing equipment, lighting, etc. Firm and non-
firm loads need to be in separate circuits so that backup power (or firm power) could be supplied 
to the firm loads in case of power interruption. Backup power could be provided by the plant 
itself (or contracted from a supplier) to supply the plant loads if the interruption of power lasts 
longer than permissible. Reactive power for voltage support could also be provided by the plant 
itself. 
Determine power supply and ancillary services options in the region 
After analyzing their electric loads, customers would need to know the power supply and 
ancillary services options available in the region. With this information, for example, a plant 
could contract the following services from: 
Host utility: 80 MW of firm power, transmission service and some ancillary services (frequency 
regulation, load regulation, scheduling and coordination of services, voltage support). 
Supplier A: 100 MW of non-firm power, and generation reserves (ancillary service). 
Customer: Backup power (e.g. cogeneration plant). 
Power supply and ancillary services options could be determined by contacting: 
Consultants- they could perform a power flow analysis on the regional grid to calculate power 
flow constraints and determine the possible routes for power flow. Information needed to 
perform this analysis would be available from FERC's Form 715 filings. Consultants with these 
expertise usually have experience working at the utilities in the local region. 
Power marketers- most of them have experience with the deregulated natural gas market. They 
would have the expertise necessary to determine possible routes for power flow, identifying 
potential power suppliers and setting up power transactions. Power marketers could be 
contacted through the Power Marketing Association (PMA)[1). 
Potential suppliers- customers could issue Requests For Proposals (RFPs) for power supply to 
utilities, power marketers and NUGs in the region. 
For example, in 1994, the University of Missouri (UM) issued an RFP for power 
supply[2]. In this particular RFP, suppliers had to: (a) offer delivered prices at levels guaranteed 
to be below UM's electricity cost, (b) demonstrate financial capabilities to 
6 
make such guarantees, and (c) be credible power suppliers of the quantities and qualities 
required by UM. 
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Host utilities - most of the utilities have been involved in wholesale transactions and thus, should 
have the expertise necessary for setting up retail wheeling transactions. Once the customer 
establishes a partnership (or if retail wheeling is regulated), it could approach the host utility to 
determine potential suppliers of power in the region. Utilities would probably set up power 
marketing departments for this type of transactions. 
RTGs- these are expected to file regional transmission pricing systems and set up region-wide-
wholesale power trading systems. Although RTGs were conceived to deal with wholesale level 
transactions, these trading systems could probably be extended to include retail level 
transactions. 
Locate new facilities in locations with cheap supply of electric power 
A deregulated market would create new options for companies seeking to build facilities 
with cheap supply of electric power. Potential locations for new facilities would be found after 
conducting a study on power supply options on the region. 
Examples of these locations could be: areas close to NUGs (a transmission line to 
connect the facility to the NUGs might also need to be built, which requires approval from the 
state PUC), industrial parks supplied by cogeneration facilities (in areas where electric power is 
expensive), and areas served by utilities willing to transmit or buy power from other suppliers. 
Form groups of customers to increase negotiating power 
Current developments in the power market show that large customers get the benefits 
from a deregulated power market before smaller customers do. 
Small to medium-sized industrial customers (in particular, those fed by the same 
substation or bus) could form groups to increase their negotiating power in transactions and 
negotiations with utilities. These groups could be similar to municipalities and school districts[3] 
(municipalities are treated by EPAct as wholesale customers) which are already seeking 
approval for retail wheeling transactions in the state of New York. 
The negotiating power of these groups would increase if they are considered a single 
customer since their electric loads would add up. Most these groups do not have "bypass" 
capacity, so it is probably that they would probably not obtain retail wheeling (or transactions that 
resemble retail wheeling) unless state PUCs approve these transactions (or issue the appropriate 
legislation) or these groups develop "bypass• capacity. 
For example, customers at an industrial park could approach their host utility as a group 
("the industrial parkj, instead of individually, to have more power in negotiating access to other 
power suppliers. The possibility of installing a cogeneration plant to supply the entire industrial 
park should be considered since this would increase the park's "bypass" capacity and provide it 
with backup power in case of power curtailment. Finally, thermal energy could also be supplied 
to the companies in the industrial park. 
Consider the use of financial instruments to hedge risk 
Electric power would become a commodity in a deregulated market. Utilities, 
cogenerators, financial houses and others are forming Independent Power Marketers affiliates. 
Financial instruments {or "derivativesj would provide risk management opportunities to the 
different players for the power market (IOUs, NUGs, retail customers). 
Some of the derivatives that could be created in the next years are: 
Forward contracts- agreements for delivery of power in the future for a period of time. 
Electricity futures- standardized contract traded on an exchange. The New York Mercantile 
Exchange {NYMEX) is planning a contract for electricity futures. 
Electric rate swaps - a customer buying power at a fixed rate and another buying power at a 
variable rate {e.g. based on marginal cost), could swap their rates {or part of them). This is done 
when the risk profiles of the customers do not match their electric rate. 
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Options - contracts in which a fee is paid for the right to enter into a forward contract. 
The Association of Power Marketers could help customers choose the appropriate 
derivative for their needs. Once NYMEX starts working with electricity futures, it is expected that 
the use of derivatives will become more common in the electric industry. 
REFERENCES 
1 The Power Marketing Association: 1619 22nd St. S-200, Arlington, 
VA22202, Phone: (703) 892-0010. 
2 More information on this particular RFP can be obtained by contacting 
Scott Spiewak, Cogen Power Marketing, 747 Leigh Mill Rd., Great Falls, 
VA 22066. Phone: (703) 759-5060. 
3 From a NYPA representative. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
EPAct- The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (October 1992). EPAct brought a more competitive 
structure to the electric power market industry. One of EPAct's objectives is to stimulate 
competition in the generation sector, increase efficiency in the electric industry and lower 
consumer's energy bills. EPAct defines policy objectives, creates a framework to develop them, 
and gives responsibility for the regulation to the PUCs and FERC. 
FERC - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This entity has jurisdiction over interstate 
transmissions and wholesale electric transactions. 
IOU- Investor-owned utility. 
NOPR - FERC's Notice of Proposed Regulation. FERC issues NOPRs to obtain comments from 
the interested parties on a specific topic. The "mega-NOPR" was issued March 29, 1994 and 
deals with the following issues: 
stranded cost recovery, 
"unbundling• of services and 
transmission pricing 
NUG - non-utility generators. Includes QFs, IPPs and EWGs (see definitions below). 
QF- Qualifying Facility. Includes cogenerators and Small Power Producers that satisfy certain 
requirements. 
IPP - independent power producer. Producers that do not own or control transmission system 
and have no affiliation with a traditional electric utility having a franchised service area. 
EWG- an exempt wholesale generator is a type of IPP. Owns or operates a facility within the 
US and generates electricity for resale. There are exceptions if the EWG is outside the US. 
PUC - State Public Utility Commission. Each state has a PUC that regulates the utility industry at 
the state level. PUCs have the responsibility for setting retail rates and associated issues as well 
as the authority to require or deny right of construction of transmission lines. 
RTG - A provision not included in EPAct was a negotiated agreement between all affected 
parties to form Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs). RTGs would be voluntary organizations 
of transmission owners, transmission users, and other entities interested in coordinating 
transmission planning, operation and use on a regional (or inter-regional) basis. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ACC - Arizona Corporation Commission. 
AEPCO - Arizona Electric Power Cooperative Inc. AEPCO is a 
generation and transmission utility. 
Cogenerator - a cogenerator produces: (a) electric or shaft 
energy and (b) steam or other forms of useful thermal energy 
used for industrial, commercial, heating or cooling purposes. 
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ConEd - Consolidated Edison. ConEd is a utility that operates 
in the state of New York. 
CPUC - California Public Utilities Commission. 
DSM - Demand-Side Management. The objective of DSM programs is 
to reduce the electric demand on utilities. 
ELCON - Electricity Consumers Resource Council. 
EPAct - Energy Policy Act of 1992 (October 1992). EPAct brought 
a more competitive structure to the electric power market 
industry. One of EPAct's objectives is to stimulate competition 
in the generation sector, increase efficiency in the electric 
industry and lower consumer's energy bills. 
EWG - Exempt Wholesale Generator. An EWG is an IPP that owns or 
operates a facility within the US and generates electricity for 
resale. There are exceptions if the EWG is outside the US. 
FERC - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. FERC has 
jurisdiction over interstate transmissions and wholesale 
electric transactions. 
IOU - Investor-owned utility. 
IPP - Independent Power Producer. Producers that do not own or 
control transmission system and have no affiliation with a 
traditional electric utility having a franchised service area. 
IRP - Integrated Resource Planning. IRP is a planning process 
for selecting reliable generation plants at the lowest system 
cost. This is achieved by opening the process to public review 
and considering both the supply and demand side scenarios. 
MWh - Mega-Watt-hr. 
MPSC - Michigan Public Service Commission. 
NERC - North American Electric Reliability Council. The NERC 
and its nine regional councils ensure the reliable and efficient 
operation of the synchronous ac regions. 
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NOPR- FERC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. FERC issues NOPRs 
to obtain comments from the interested parties on specific 
topics. 
NRRI - National Regulatory Research Institute. 
NSS - North Star Steel. NSS selected a site in Arizona for the 
construction of steel recycling plant. 
NUG - Non-Utility Generators. Includes QFs, IPPs and EWGs. 
NYPA - New York Power Authority. NYPA is a public wholesale 
power supplier that owns generation and transmission facilities 
in the state of New York. 
NYPSC - New York Public Service Commission. 
PG&E - Pacific Gas & Electric Co. PG&E filed a wheeling 
proposal that is still under consideration at the CPUC (February 
1995). 
PMA - Power Marketing Association. The PMA can be contacted at: 
1619 22nd St. s-200, Arlington, VA22202, Phone: (703) 892-0010. 
Poolco - This is policy proposed by the CPUC in the order issued 
on May 24, 1995. The "Poolco" would be a central wholesale 
pool, run by an independent party. 
PUC - State Public Utility Commission. Each state has a PUC that 
regulates the utility industry at the state level. PUCs have 
the responsibility for setting retail rates and associated 
issues as well as the authority to require or deny right of 
construction of transmission lines. 
PUHCA - Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935). PUHCA was 
designed to protect consumers, to stop high electric rates and 
to improve reliability in the electric utility industry. 
PURPA - Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (1978). PURPA 
objectives were: (a) to make on-site generation a viable 
alternative for large industrial users of steam and (b) to open 
the electric generation sector to competition. 
PSI - PSI Energies. PSI is a utility located in Indiana. 
PSNH - Public Service Commission of New Hampshire. 
QF - PURPA Qualifying Facility. Includes cogenerators and 
Small Power Producers that satisfy certain requirements defined 
by PURPA. 
RFP - Requests For Proposals. 
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RIN - Real-time Information Networks. RINs would provide 
outside parties with the same real-time information on 
transmission and operations that the owner utilities have access 
to. 
RTG - Regional Transmission Groups. RTGs would be voluntary 
organizations of transmission owners, transmission users, and 
other entities interested in coordinating transmission planning, 
operation and use on a regional (or inter-regional) basis. 
Small power production facility - this facility produces: (a) 
electric energy using biomass, waste, renewable or geothermal 
resources, and (b) has a power production capacity less than 80 
MW (with some exceptions). 
WAPA - The Western Area Power Administration. The WAPA is a 
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